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This article covers cases from Volumes 404 through 464 of the South
Western Reporter (Third Edition) and federal cases during the same
period that the authors believe are noteworthy to the jurisprudence on
the applicable subject.
I. INTRODUCTION
Texas courts continue to see significant challenges to foreclosures from
the national single-family mortgage/foreclosure meltdown, including the
“show me the note” defense and standing to challenge assignments of
deeds of trust. Unfortunately, there is still no consistent message in these
cases.
In what seems to be a trend, a number of courts are making incorrect
holdings (on assignability of receivables from municipal utility districts)
and statements in dicta (the UCC does not govern notes secured by re-
alty). Also, a surprise awaits in a case addressing limitation after a re-
straining order and temporary injunction.
As in previous years, many cases during the Survey period provide
drafting lessons for the practitioner. In one case, the parties relied on
industry vernacular to define the remedies available under a purchase
and sale contract, but there appeared to be no consensus between the
parties, or in the industry at large, on the meaning of the terms used
which left the resolution of the matter to the jury. In another case of note,
which focused on the difference between a covenant and a condition pre-
cedent in a purchase and sale contract, both the majority and dissent re-
lied on the same cases to come to completely different conclusions
regarding whether the clause at issue was a covenant or condition prece-
dent. Regardless of whether you are more persuaded by the analysis of
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the majority or dissent, laid out in more detail below, the message from
the case is clear to all practitioners: careful word choice and clear drafting
are essential to achieving your intended result.
Also of note, during the Survey period was an issue rarely dealt with by
practitioners, the statute of frauds, but which played a key role in the
outcome of cases involving the lease of mineral interests, the exercise of
options to extend a lease, and the sale of foreclosed assets by a bank.
The most notable decisions during the Survey period came via the
Texas Supreme Court. The Texas Supreme Court announced significant
decisions in the area of roads via easements by necessity, trespass re-
quirements, and application of premises liability statutory limitations.
II. MORTGAGES, LIENS AND FORECLOSURES
A. NATIONAL MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT
Duque v. Wells Fargo, N.A. interprets certain provisions of the “Na-
tional Mortgage Settlement.”1 Duque defaulted on her home mortgage
loan, and Wells Fargo foreclosed. On motion for summary judgment,
Duque alleged Wells Fargo violated the consent judgment (the National
Mortgage Settlement) in United States v. Bank of America Corp., which
contained the National Mortgage Settlement in connection with various
government suits against large home mortgage lenders.2 Wells Fargo al-
leged that Duque had no standing to sue under the National Mortgage
Settlement, because she was neither a party nor a third party beneficiary.
Duque, however, claims to be a third party beneficiary based on a provi-
sion that provides “borrowers are third party beneficiaries under [desig-
nated paragraphs].”3 A third party beneficiary status is only conferred if
the parties to the contract specified such intention; “[i]ncidental benefits
that may flow from a contract . . . do not confer the right to enforce the
contract” as a third party beneficiary.4 The First Houston Court of Ap-
peals reasoned that although such provisions may have made Duque, as a
borrower, a third party beneficiary in connection with loan modification
agreements, it did not make Duque a third party beneficiary to the Na-
tional Mortgage Settlement.5
B. STANDING TO CHALLENGE ASSIGNMENT OF MORTGAGE
In a continuation of the legal meltdown in the wake of the single-family
mortgage debacle, Texas courts continue to see cases relating to the
“show me the note” defense and standing to challenge assignments of a
1. Duque v. Wells Fargo, N.A., 462 S.W.3d 542, 546 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2015, no pet.).
2. See United States v. Bank of Am. Corp., 922 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2013).
3. Duque, 462 S.W.3d at 547. The first recited paragraph deals with lenders’ obliga-
tions to accept and process pending loan mortgage requests; the second provision relates to
a servicer’s obligation to honor trial or permanent loan modifications. Id. at 544–45.
4. Id. at 547 (quoting S. Tex. Water Auth. v. Lomas, 223 S.W.3d 304, 306 (Tex. 2007)).
5. Id. at 550.
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deed of trust. In this Survey period, Texas courts addressed two conflict-
ing cases on the standing issue, each with the same plaintiff party.
In Morlock, L.L.C. v. Nationstar Mortgage, L.L.C. (Morlock I),
Morlock purchased a property pursuant to a homeowner association lien
foreclosure and then challenged Nationstar Mortgage’s, the first lien deed
of trust holder, right to foreclose.6 The original deed of trust was given to
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS), for the benefit of
First Coastal Mortgage, to whom a promissory note was payable. MERS
assigned the deed of trust to Nationstar Mortgage, who initiated the fore-
closure sale. On appeal from a denial of the summary judgment motion to
enjoin the foreclosure, Morlock alleged “Nationstar [was] not the owner
and holder of the [n]ote” and should not be allowed to foreclose7; Na-
tionstar countered that Morlock had no standing to challenge the validity
of the purported deed of trust assignments. The Fourteenth Houston
Court of Appeals concluded that the issue of standing depends on
whether a party has a justiciable interest in its outcome and that Morlock
had standing to challenge the assignments.8 Further, the court of appeals
drove another stake into the heart of the “show me the note” defense,
pointing out that the Texas Property Code does not require, as a condi-
tion to foreclosure, that the foreclosing party prove it is the holder or
owner of the note, which is secured by the deed of trust.9
In the sister case, Morlock, L.L.C. v. Bank of New York (Morlock II),
Morlock acquired title to property as the purchaser at a foreclosure sale
by an owners’ association.10 After such acquisition, the first lienholder,
Bank of New York, asserted defaults and attempted to foreclose;
Morlock brought suit for wrongful foreclosure. The original deed of trust
was executed by Sandesara to Mortgage Investment Lending Associates,
which assigned the deed of trust to Countrywide Document Custody Ser-
vices, which ultimately assigned the deed of trust to the Bank of New
York; each of those assignments was duly recorded in the public records.
Morlock alleged that Bank of New York was not the owner and holder of
the note since the deed of trust assignments were not accompanied by an
6. Morlock, L.L.C. v. Nationstar Mortg., L.L.C., 447 S.W.3d 42, 43–44 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).
7. Id. at 45.
8. Id. at 45–46 (citing Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex.
2005) (plaintiff was an aggrieved party); Goswami v. Metro. Sav. and Loan Ass’n., 751
S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tex. 1988) (third party with a property interest affected by a foreclosure
sale had standing); Am. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. of Hous. v. Musick, 531 S.W.2d 581, 584–86
(Tex. 1975) (a party whose property interest is affected has standing to challenge a foreclo-
sure sale); Henry v. Mr. M. Convenient Stores, Inc., 543 S.W.2d 393, 396 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (holder with equitable interest in real property
had standing to challenge a deed of trust in a suit to remove cloud on title); and Florey v.
Estate of McConnell, 212 S.W.3d 439, 443–44 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied) (joint
owner of real property had standing to assert invalidity of deed of trust to which it was not
a party)).
9. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.0001(4) (West 2015).
10. Morlock, L.L.C. v. Bank of N.Y.C., 448 S.W.3d 514, 516 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).
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assignment of the note.11 In defense, Bank of New York alleged that
Morlock had no standing to challenge the assignment from Mortgage In-
vestment to Countrywide and from Countrywide to Bank of New York.
The First Houston Court of Appeals cited numerous Texas cases for the
proposition that “[a] plaintiff who is not a party to an assignment lacks
standing to challenge the assignment on grounds that render it merely
voidable at the election of one of the parties.”12 Texas cases have held
that deeds obtained via fraud are not facially void, but rather voidable at
the grantor’s election.13 This court of appeals relied upon Nobles v. Mar-
cus, which distinguished challenges based upon fraud (a voidable convey-
ance) and forgery (a void conveyance).14 Morlock did not allege a forgery
in the instrument, so the court of appeals concluded that, absent forgery,
there was no standing to allege fraud because Morlock was not a party to
the conveyancing document.15 The court of appeals distinguished cases
relied upon by Morlock as being inapplicable, noting that one case in-
volved a voidable defect due to a lack of authority to enter an assignment
on behalf of the corporate principal,16 and in the other, the court did not
consider standing to challenge.17
So, in Morlock I, standing to challenge the assignments was allowed
based on a theory of justiciable interest in the property, but in Morlock
II, standing was denied on the basis of the assignment being only a voida-
ble, as opposed to void, conveyance. Confusion still reigns among Texas
courts on the standing issue.
Another of the cases on standing to challenge an assignment of a deed
of trust is Vazquez v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.18 Vazquez chal-
lenged the validity of an assignment of a deed of trust from the original
mortgagee to Deutsche Bank. Deposition evidence presented by Vazquez
revealed a claim of forgery that would make the instrument void and
would give standing to challenge the assignment to which Vazquez was
not a party.19 The deposition testimony, by the party who purportedly
signed the assignment of the deed of trust, was to the effect that the sig-
nature was an electronic signature. He claimed that he did not directly
authorize it, did not know any of the parties who affixed his electronic
signature to the document, and was unaware that the document was exe-
cuted. Deutsche Bank filed a motion for summary judgment and
presented no evidence, believing that Vazquez’s petition was insufficient
to support a summary judgment claim. However, Deutsche Bank was
11. Id.
12. Id. at 517.
13. See, e.g., Nobles v. Marcus, 533 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tex. 1976).
14. Morlock, L.L.C., 448 S.W.3d at 517; see Nobles, 533 S.W.2d at 926–27.
15. Morlock, L.L.C., 448 S.W.3d at 517.
16. Id. (distinguishing Reinagel v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 735 F.3d 220, 226 (5th
Cir. 2013)).
17. Id. (distinguishing Reeves v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 544 F. App’x 564, 568 (5th
Cir. 2013) (per curiam), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2668 (2014)).
18. 441 S.W.3d 783, 785–86 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.).
19. Id. at 789.
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mistaken, and the First Houston Court of Appeals determined that Vaz-
quez presented sufficient evidence to show a void instrument, which enti-
tled her standing to challenge the assignment.20 In rendering this opinion,
the court of appeals cited and relied upon the recent U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit decision in Reinagel v. Deutsche Bank National
Trust Co.21 This is an important reminder to practitioners as to what evi-
dence is needed to raise a forgery issue and to carefully consider the ex-
isting evidence when filing summary judgment motions.
C. DEFICIENCIES; MUD RECEIVABLES
In Marhaba Partners v. Kindron Holdings, the Fourteenth Houston
Court of Appeals addressed deficiency judgments in a multiple foreclo-
sure scenario.22 Marhaba obtained a land development loan pledging as
collateral the subject property pursuant to a deed of trust and the receiv-
ables from a bond sale by a municipal utility district (MUD Receivables),
pursuant to an Assignment of Right to Reimbursement. The develop-
ment lender, City Bank, after a default by Marhaba, foreclosed on the
deed of trust and acquired title to the property.23 Subsequent to such real
estate foreclosure, City Bank sold its remaining interest in the develop-
ment loan to Kindron Holdings, which included the existing unsatisfied
liability under the note and the MUD Receivables. After the foreclosure
sale and credit bid, the deficiency remaining was approximately $2 mil-
lion. Kindron subsequently foreclosed on the MUD Receivables and pur-
chased them at the sale for a credit bid of $300,000, leaving a $1.7 million
deficiency. Kindron filed a declaratory action to declare that it was the
owner of the MUD Receivables.24 Marhaba alleged that this was a suit on
a deficiency, but Kindron alleged that the action was merely to confirm
its realization on collateral. Marhaba’s attempt to introduce evidence as
to the fair market value of the foreclosed real estate was disallowed by
the trial court and affirmed by the court of appeals, concluding that the
subject action was not an action to recover a deficiency, but rather an
action to confirm a nonjudicial foreclosure sale.25 The court of appeals
concluded that calculation of a deficiency is made only after all collateral
had been disposed of and is not to be determined after each collateral
item is foreclosed.26
20. Id. at 790.
21. Id. at 787; see Reinagel, 735 F.3d 220.
22. Marhaba Partners Ltd. P’ship v. Kindron Holdings, LLC, 457 S.W.3d 208, 215–16
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied).
23. Id. at 211.
24. The court of appeals noted that the municipal utility district had refused to ac-
knowledged Kindron’s purchase of the MUD Receivables. Id. at 212 n.5.
25. Id. at 216.
26. Id. at 215–16 (citing Branch Banking & Tr. Co. v. TCI Luna Ventures, LLC, No.
05-12-00653-CV, 2013 WL 1456651, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 9, 2013, no pet.) (where
twelve properties secured a loan and a deficiency could not be asserted after five proper-
ties were foreclosed in an effort to enjoin the sixth foreclosure); Comiskey v. FH Partners,
LLC, 373 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (a lender with
2016] Real Property 393
In dicta, the court of appeals raised an issue as to the assignability of
municipal bond proceeds, even though the parties had not raised the is-
sue.27 The authors believe that this is unfortunate dicta. The basis of the
court of appeals’s concern was whether municipal bond proceeds can be
used as collateral only if the funds paid construction costs for infrastruc-
ture improvements, citing Cameron County Savings Association v.
Cornett Construction Co.28 Unsurprisingly, the court of appeals found
conflicting authority in Southern Surety Co. of New York v. First State
Bank of Marquez,29 where a subcontractor on a state highway depart-
ment job was allowed to assign the right to receive funds as collateral for
a loan to the subcontractor, and in J.W.D., Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co.,30
where an assignee of a laborer’s claim for wages was not prohibited from
filing and pursuing a claim against a payment bond merely because the
assignee was not the person who actually furnished the labor.31 In the
experience of this author, the court of appeals’s concern does not fit cur-
rent practice. Normally, the developer builds the infrastructure improve-
ments with funds from a development loan for which the MUD
Receivables are pledged as additional collateral. Either before or at the
closing of the development loan, the municipal utility district issues bonds
for reimbursement of the infrastructure improvements, and the receiv-
ables are only used to reimburse the developer for actual infrastructure
construction costs incurred.
D. HOME EQUITY LOANS
Hill v. Sword provides guidance on whether a refinancing constituted a
new extension of credit or was the refinance of an existing home equity
lien.32 In 2004, Hill executed a $60,000 note and deed of trust in favor of
Sword secured by a 126-acre tract of land. In 2006, Hill gave a new
$200,000 note and deed of trust to Sword. Eventually, Hill defaulted, and
Sword filed a declaratory judgment action in which there was an agreed
judgment in 2011 that deemed the 2004 and 2006 deeds of trust to be
valid and enforceable and provided for a $327,000 award.33 At that time,
a new note was executed in the amount of the judgment award and se-
cured by a new deed of trust. Hill later claimed that the 126-acre tract was
his family homestead and that the 2011 deed of trust did not meet the
constitutional requirements to establish a valid lien on a homestead. As
the Tyler Court of Appeals noted, homesteads in Texas are subject to
two properties as security was not required to credit the fair market value of the first
foreclosure before foreclosing on the second property)).
27. Id. at 218 n.11.
28. Id.; Cameron Cty. Savings Ass’n v. Cornett Constr. Co., 712 S.W.2d 580 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
29. 54 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1932, writ ref’d).
30. 806 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. App.—Austin 1991, no writ).
31. Marhaba Partners Ltd. P’ship, 457 S.W.3d at 218 n.11.
32. See generally Hill v. Sword, 454 S.W.3d 698 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2015, pet. denied).
33. Id. at 700.
394 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 2
strict protection from forced sales with very few exceptions,34 one of
which is a home equity loan, which evidences a new extension of credit
under Texas constitution § 50(a)(6),35 and the other is a refinance of an
existing homestead lien under Texas constitution § 50(a)(4)36 and related
statutory provisions in Texas Property Code.37 To determine the differ-
ence between a new extension of credit and a refinance of existing credit,
the court of appeals noted these factors: first, whether there was a satis-
faction and replacement of the original note, and second, whether there
was advancement of new funds.38 The current note was not the result of a
foreclosure, distinguishable from Krauss v. West;39 rather, it was a declar-
atory judgment action that the deeds of trust were enforceable.40 Conse-
quently, the 2004 and 2006 deeds of trust were not paid and satisfied. The
capitalization of attorneys’ fees into the 2011 documents did not consti-
tute new credit because the underlying note provided that the cost of
collections and enforcement, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, were
to be added to the amount due; hence, the award of attorney fees did not
constitute new extension of credit.41
The final contention of Hill was that new non-monetary obligations
were incorporated into the 2011 documents and that such constituted a
new extension of credit.42 These new non-monetary items were not
deemed extensions of credit by the court of appeals.43 The court of ap-
peals paid particular attention on the cross-default provision whereby a
default under any other loan agreement with Sword would constitute a
default under the 2011 documents.44 The court of appeals concluded that
such provision did not create a new extension of credit, noting that the
provision did not describe any other debt and that the 2006 deed of trust
provided that it secured any debt subsequently owing from Hill to
Sword.45 The court of appeals, however, discussed the cross-default pro-
vision as if it was a cross-collateralization provision, which would not be a
proper characterization.46 Such clause does not offer any additional col-
34. Id. at 702.
35. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6).
36. Id. § 50(a)(4).
37. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001(b)(5) (West 2015).
38. Hill, 454 S.W.3d at 702.
39. 123 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1938, writ dism’d judgm’t cor.)
40. Hill, 454 S.W.3d at 702–03.
41. Id. at 703.
42. Such non-monetary obligations included: (1) notice of hazardous materials spills;
(2) compliance with environmental laws; (3) certification of no prior hazardous spills; (4)
defaults under other agreements with Sword; (5) rights of inspection; (6) waiver of mar-
shalling; (7) waiver of release of obligations; (8) waiver of deficiency defenses; (9) grant of
a new security interest in farm equipment; (10) recitation that the deed of trust constituted
a fixture filing; (11) the provision for realty and personalty be sold as a whole; (12) rights of
a secured party under Article 9 of the UCC; (13) rights as to new collateral; and (14)
restrictions on mining. Id. at 703–04.
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lateral, nor does it require the existing note to secure other indebtedness;
rather, it is merely a default under the 2011 documents if Hill defaults in
other documents between it and Sword. Consequently, this case should
not be cited for the proposition that such a provision constitutes a cross-
collateralization, which might be an extension of new credit under the
Texas home equity rules.
E. FORCIBLE DETAINER ACTION AFTER FORECLOSURE
In a case of first impression, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals
in Yarbrough v. Household Finance Corp. III addressed the jurisdiction
of a justice court in a forcible detainer action under an allegation of a
forged deed of trust.47 After a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, Household
Finance brought a forcible detainer action against Yarbrough, who pled
forgery of the original deed of trust upon which the foreclosure sale was
based. Such allegation was supported by an affidavit of Yarbrough that
Yarbrough did not sign the deed of trust and that it was a forgery.48 Yar-
brough appealed the summary judgment based on the lack of jurisdiction
of the justice court to address that issue. The court of appeals noted that
forcible detainer actions are only applicable to resolve the right for imme-
diate possession of the property when the merits of title are not in contro-
versy.49 Raising the issue of forgery presents “a genuine issue of title so
intertwined with the issue of possession as to preclude jurisdiction in the
justice court.”50 In support of its holdings, the court of appeals itemized
issues involved in the propriety of a foreclosure sale, which did not consti-
tute intertwined title issues and would not affect the jurisdictional author-
ity of a justice court, and issues in which title was so intertwined with
possession issues negating the jurisdiction of a justice court to a forcible
detainer action.51
47. Yarbrough v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 455 S.W.3d 277, 278 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
48. Id. at 279.
49. Id. at 280 (citing Salaymeh v. Plaza Centro, LLC, 264 S.W.3d 431, 435 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.)).
50. Id. at 283.
51. Id. at 281–82. There was no intertwined title dispute in any of the following: (1)
allegation of a foreclosure sale conducted improperly; (2) allegations that conditions prece-
dent to a foreclosure sale were not satisfied; (3) allegations that certain breach conditions
excused note payment; (4) allegation that the underlying note was usurious and whether
acceleration was proper; (5) allegation of invalid assignments and other improprieties re-
lating to the foreclosure process; (6) defects regarding the bank’s authority for a foreclo-
sure sale; (7) violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act; and (8) lack of proper
notice of the foreclosure or proper opportunity to cure a default. Id. However, there was
an intertwined relationship in the following circumstances: (1) the deed of trust provided
no tenancy relationship after foreclosure; (2) a contract of deed was disputed as to whether
the defendant was a purchaser or a tenant at will; (3) the disputed enforceability of a
contract creating a lien; (4) questions under a rental agreement as to holdover tenancy or
adverse possession; (5) a dispute as to whether a landlord/tenant or buyer/seller relation-
ship existed; and (6) a substitute trustee’s deed alleged to be void. Id. at 282.
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F. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Landers v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC involves a unique twist on the
statute of limitations in a foreclosure action.52 Landers obtained a home
loan from Nationstar and defaulted, whereupon Nationstar accelerated
the debt. Landers brought suit to enjoin the foreclosure, and a temporary
restraining order was entered against Nationstar. Subsequently (being
nearly four years after the acceleration), the trial court entered an agreed
temporary injunction. Neither the “temporary restraining order nor the
agreed temporary injunction prohibited Nationstar from filing a suit for
judicial foreclosure” or from initiating a suit on the debt, they merely
restrained a nonjudicial foreclosure sale.53 Nationstar ultimately filed an
action for judicial foreclosure four years after the acceleration of the
debt. Landers challenged this action as in violation of the statute of limi-
tations, and the Tyler Court of Appeals agreed that the limitation period
was not tolled by the temporary restraining order or temporary injunc-
tion as to a suit on the debt or a judicial foreclosure.54 Consequently,
practitioners should take note from this case that orders relating to in-
junctions on foreclosure sales should include a restraint against a nonjudi-
cial foreclosure, a judicial foreclosure, and an action on the debt, or
appropriate actions should be commenced within the statute of limita-
tions period for any of those events not covered by the restraining order
or injunction.
III. DEBTOR/CREDITOR
A. REFUSAL OF TENDER
A wrongful refusal of tender of payment was addressed in U.S. Bank,
N.A. v. Smith (In re Smith).55 In this case, Smith executed a first lien note
and deed of trust upon the purchase of real property but later refinanced
the property executing a Texas home equity note and deed of trust. The
first lienholder delivered a payoff quote to the title company for the sub-
sequent home equity refinancing. After the date of the payoff quote, but
prior to the refinance closing, Smith made a monthly mortgage payment
to the first lienholder.56 The title company wired the first lienholder
$72,000.08 for payoff of the first lien, which sums were rejected and re-
turned.57 A common law tender in Texas is accomplished by “payment of
the underlying [debt], . . . other tender of the amount of the mortgage
debt, or . . . any other satisfaction of the note which the lien has been
52. See generally Landers v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 461 S.W.3d 923 (Tex. App.—
Tyler 2015, pet. denied).
53. Id. at 924, 926.
54. Id. at 926.
55. 524 B.R. 125 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015).
56. The payoff demand was dated March 12, 2007, in the amount of $71,504.66 with a
per diem rate and a late charge and wire fee quoted. Id. at 130.
57. The case does not specify what funds were actually due at the refinance closing,
but the court acknowledged that it was sufficient to extinguish the first lien debt at the time
of the payment. Id. at 135–36.
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given to secure.”58 Because the tendered payment was sufficient to dis-
charge the existing lienholder’s debt, such tender discharged the first
deed of trust lien.59
Despite a correct application of the tender rule, this U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of Texas incorrectly determined that the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) was not applicable to interpreting a
promissory note secured by real estate.60 The bankruptcy court stated
that “comments to section three of the UCC make it clear that a note
secured solely by real estate is not governed by the UCC.”61 Such state-
ment, in this author’s opinion, runs contrary to long established and well
settled principles of Texas law, used daily in commercial real estate trans-
actions. The context of the applicable comment to § 3.104 of the UCC
deals mainly with whether a document is a negotiable instrument and
why the use of words “to order of” or “to bearer” make the instrument
clearly a negotiable instrument within the purview of the UCC. The sec-
tion quoted by the bankruptcy court deals with contracts that may con-
tain promises to pay money, such as a purchase and sale agreement of
real estate.62 Consequently, the bankruptcy court wrongfully relies on
language dealing with contracts that contain a promise to pay as opposed
to a formal promissory note containing “pay to the order of.” The bank-
ruptcy cites a number of cases in support of its position63: the first being
Horton v. M&T Bank, which held that the UCC duty of good faith and
fair dealing does not apply to a note secured by real property64—different
from holding that a promissory note secured by real property is not a
negotiable instrument under the UCC—and the second, Clapp v. Wells
Fargo, N.A., for the proposition that a mortgage note is not within the
UCC because it relates to a deed of trust with a lien on real property.65
Further, the bankruptcy court discussed a case specifying that “a [UCC]
§ 3.603 analysis should be applied to [a] promissory note secured by real
property”66; however, the bankruptcy court rejected that theory.67 The
58. In re Harwood, 404 B.R. 366, 401 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2009) (citing Lillienstern v.
First Nat’l Bank, 288 S.W. 477, 478–79 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1926, no writ)).
59. In re Smith, 524 B.R. at 136.
60. Id. at 134–35.
61. Id. at 134.
62. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.104, cmt. 2 (West 2015) (providing, in relevant
part, as follows: “Article 3 is not meant to apply to contracts for the sale of goods or
services or the sale or lease of real property or similar writings that can contain a promise
to pay money. The use of words of negotiability in such contracts would be an aberration.
Absence of the words precludes any arguments that such contracts might be negotiable
instruments.”) (emphasis added).
63. See In re Smith, 524 B.R. at 134–35.
64. Horton v. M&T Bank, No. 4: 13-CV-525-A, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166772, at
*10–12 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2013).
65. Clapp v. Wells Fargo, N.A., No. 4: 13-CV-035-A, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58729, at
*10 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2014) (quoting Vogel v. Travelers Indem. Co., 966 S.W.2d 748, 753
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.)).
66. In re Smith, 524 B.R. at 135.
67. Id. (discussing Rabo Agrifinance Inc. v. Terra XXI Ltd., 257 F. App’x 732, 735 (5th
Cir. 2007)).
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bankruptcy court continued its spurious reasoning by distinguishing two
cases dealing with refusal of a tender of payment where the collateral was
not real property secured by a deed of trust.68 This bankruptcy court is
wrong in its holding that a promissory note securing property covered by
a deed of trust is not governed by the Texas Uniform Commercial Code,
and practitioners can only hope that other courts do not follow such
reasoning.
B. ATTORNEYS’ FEES
In what may be a case of first impression, the Fourteenth Houston
Court of Appeals in Murphy v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., considered
whether the Texas constitution provisions for a home equity loan pre-
clude the award of attorneys’ fees under the Texas Declaratory Judgment
Act.69 Murphy obtained a home equity loan from Wells Fargo, and after
defaulting on the loan within one year, brought a declaratory action
against Wells Fargo alleging an oral promise to refinance the loan at a
lesser interest rate if Murphy had performed under the loan for at least
two years. Murphy lost the case, and Wells Fargo was awarded over
$100,000 in legal fees, to which Murphy takes issue. The court majority,
following Murphy’s allegations, determined that the requirements for a
home equity loan under the Texas constitution70 requires, as one of its
conditions for the foreclosure of a home equity loan against a homestead,
that the debtor cannot have personal liability for the debt. The home eq-
uity loan documents included appropriate provisions in the note, loan
agreement, and deed of trust that the debtors had no personal liability.
Consequently, the court of appeals held that “[t]he nonrecourse status of
the loan, established by the Texas [c]onstitution and the plain meaning of
the loan documents, mandates that [Murphy is] not personally liable for
the attorneys’ fees Wells Fargo incurred prosecuting this litigation.”71 Jus-
tice Frost, however, issued a well-reasoned dissenting opinion, noting that
the Texas Declaratory Judgment Act, which preceded the adoption of the
subject provision of the Texas constitution, is a separate statutory provi-
sion providing for the award of attorneys’ fees, and that such constitu-
tional provision did not invalidate the attorneys’ fees provisions of the
Texas Declaratory Judgment Act.72 Furthermore, the dissent reasons that
the equity home loan provisions of the Texas constitution address the for-
feiture or foreclosure of the homestead property; the home equity loan
documents in this case complied with such provisions so that the lender
would be entitled to exercise foreclosure remedies against the home-
68. Id. at 135–36 (distinguishing Lillienstern v. First Nat’l Bank, 288 S.W. 477 (Tex.
Civ. App.—Texarkana 1926, no writ); Sanders v. Blakney, 294 S.W. 238 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Eastland 1927, no writ)).
69. Murphy v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 455 S.W.3d 621 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2013) (mem. op.), rev’d in part, 458 S.W.3d 912 (Tex. 2015).
70. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(C).
71. Murphy, 455 S.W.3d. at 630.
72. Id. at 639 (Frost, J., dissenting).
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stead.73 The cases cited by the majority are refuted by Justice Frost,
pointing out that Fein74 did not address attorneys’ fees in the context of a
declaratory judgment action,75 and distinguishing In re Mullin,76 since no
party sought attorneys’ fees in a declaratory judgment action.77
During this Survey period, the court of appeals’s decision was appealed
and heard by the Texas Supreme Court in Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v.
Murphy.78 The supreme court noted that it was without dispute that the
home equity loan documents limited the source of funds from which
Wells Fargo could seek payment of the loan.79 While the supreme court
attempted to look at non-constitutional grounds to resolve the dispute,
the definition of extension of credit referred specifically to that term as
used in § 50(a)(6) of the Texas constitution; therefore, the supreme court
had to consider the constitutional definition in order to interpret the
home equity loan documents.80 “Extension of credit” had been previ-
ously defined “to consist of ‘all terms of the loan transaction,’” which
would include any provisions relating to “payment of principal, interest,
taxes, insurance and . . . related expenses.”81 Therefore, the supreme
court concluded that, if the terms of the home equity loan documents
covered the attorneys’ fees awarded under the declaratory judgment ac-
tion, such fees would fall within the nonrecourse provisions of the Texas
constitution for home equity loans.82 In this case, the supreme court iden-
tified a number of relevant provisions, including an obligation for attor-
neys’ fees to enforce the note, paying off any liens with priority,
appearing in court, and protecting its interest in the property and rights
under the deed of trust.83 The awarded attorneys’ fees, however, were not
involved in the enforcement of the note or covenants and agreements in
the home equity loan documents; Wells Fargo was merely defending itself
in the original declaratory action brought by Murphy.84 Hence, the su-
preme court concluded that the nature of this legal proceeding was not
the kind contemplated in the home equity documents; the actions were
not contesting the underlying loan but a declaratory action relating to
nonperformance of an oral contract, allegations of common law fraud and
Deceptive Trade Practice Act violations.85 Consequently, Wells Fargo
was entitled to a recovery and a personal judgment for its attorneys’ fees
73. Id. at 639–40.
74. Fein v. R.P.H., Inc., 68 S.W.3d 260 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet.
denied).
75. Murphy, 455 S.W.3d. at 639 (Frost, J., dissenting).
76. 433 B.R. 1, 17 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010).
77. Murphy, 455 S.W.3d. at 639 (Frost, J., dissenting).
78. 458 S.W.3d 912 (Tex. 2015).
79. Id. at 917.
80. Id. at 918




84. Id. at 918–19.
85. Id. at 919.
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since these fees arose out of a declaratory judgment action that was not
part of the contractual arrangements in the home equity loan
documents.86
C. GARNISHMENT
Inwood Nat. Bank v. Wells Fargo Bank involved a garnishment action
and addressed the issue of what constitutes an advance under the applica-
ble Texas Uniform Commercial Code provision.87 The garnishee, Pas-
chall, originally concluded a loan transaction with Inwood in 2000, which
was extended and renewed numerous times before the garnishment ac-
tion by Wells Fargo. After the judgment creditor, Wells Fargo, filed the
garnishment action, Inwood and Paschall entered into a new promissory
note that stated it was in renewal and extension, but not in novation, of
the prior note. Wells Fargo alleged that such action constituted an ad-
vance under the applicable Texas UCC provision,88 thus relying on the
exception to priority of a prior lienholder if advances were made by such
lienholder more than 45 days after such lienholder obtained knowledge
of the prior existing lien (i.e., Wells Fargo’s judgment lien).89
The term “advance” is not defined in the UCC; consequently, the Dal-
las Court of Appeals looked at the common meaning of the word.90 Ap-
parently, the court of appeals could find no applicable Texas cases but
cited Black’s Law Dictionary, defining advance as “the furnishing of
money or goods before any consideration is received in return.”91 Addi-
tionally, a definition from a New York case defined advances as “sums
put at the disposal of the borrower.”92 Even though the 2012 renewal
note was executed after the garnishment action, Inwood never advanced
any additional sums under the renewal note after the date of the garnish-
ment action and, furthermore, caused no greater burden to be placed on
the collateral than that existing prior to the garnishment.93 The court of
appeals dismissed Wells Fargo’s assertion that the execution of the re-
newal note constituted an extension of credit to Paschall.94 Longstanding
Texas law provides that a renewal note does not extinguish the old note
86. Id.
87. Inwood Nat’l Bank v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 463 S.W.3d 228, 234 (Tex. App.—
Dallas, 2015, no pet.).
88. Id. at 236.
89. Section 9.323(b) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code reads, in relevant
part, as follows:
[A] security interest is subordinate to the rights of a . . . lien creditor to the
extent that the security interest secures an advance made more than 45 days
after the person becomes a lien creditor unless the advance is made: (1) with-
out knowledge of the lien, or (2) pursuant to a commitment entered into
without knowledge of the lien.
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.323(b) (West 2015).
90. Inwood Nat’l Bank, 463 S.W.3d at 236.
91. Id. (quoting Advance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2010)).
92. Id. (quoting Dick Warner Cargo Handling Corp. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 746
F.2d 126, 130 (2d Cir. 1984)).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 239.
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unless so intended, there was no new debt, there were no additional ad-
vances under the 2012 note, and the collateral was subject to the same
burden as before.95 Therefore, the court of appeals concluded that In-
wood had priority over Wells Fargo’s garnishment claims.96
As an alternative position, Wells Fargo Bank asserted that the term
“advance” could be broadly interpreted to include things other than
money. Wells Fargo Bank offered no Texas cases but offered an Oregon
case pursuant to which a law firm obtained a security interest in the judg-
ment debtor’s assets pursuant to a commitment with the judgment debtor
predating the lien created by the garnishment.97 The court of appeals
concluded that such lien was one of the exceptions under the UCC for
preexisting commitments; therefore, Wells Fargo Bank’s reliance on this
case was not justified.98 The court of appeals, however, went on to state
that Wells Fargo Bank has identified no other value that could constitute
an advance.99 This leaves open a possible argument in future cases, and
practitioners should take note of this opening.
D. WORDS OR NUMERALS
In a “back to the basics” case, Charles R. Tips Family Trust v. PB Com-
mercial reminds practitioners of the basic rule that written words prevail
over written numerals.100 In this case, the loan amount referred to in all
of the loan documents (note, deed of trust, loan agreement and guaranty)
was written “One Million Seven Thousand and No/100 ($1,700,000.00)
Dollars.”101 As a matter of law, the UCC specifies that written words
prevail over written numerals; consequently, the First Houston Court of
Appeals concluded there was no ambiguity after applying all applicable
rules of construction.102 Because the contract was not ambiguous as so
construed, parol evidence was not admissible; therefore, the correct
amount of the debt was One Million Seven Thousand Dollars, as written
in words, not in numerals.103 An important practice point for practition-
ers was highlighted by the court of appeals when it specified that
“[n]either party sought an equitable reformation of the loan documents
in the trial court” and no issue of equitable relief was raised on appeal.104
95. Id. at 238–39.
96. Id.
97. See Boers v. Payline Sys., Inc., 928 P.2d 1010, 1013 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
98. Inwood Nat’l Bank, 463 S.W.3d at 239.
99. Id.
100. Charles R. Tips Family Tr. v. PB Commercial LLC, 459 S.W.3d 147, 154 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
101. Id. (original capitalization removed).
102. Id. at 154–55.
103. Id. at 155.
104. Id.
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IV. GUARANTIES/INDEMNITIES
A. WAIVERS
In Vince Poscente International, Inc. v. Compass Bank, Poscente al-
leged that a “guarant[y] [was] unenforceable because [it] contain[ed] [a]
homestead waiver provision[ ] that contravene Texas law.”105 The waiver
provision read: “Each guarantor waives all rights of redemption, home-
stead, and other rights or exemptions of every kind, whether arising
under common law or statute.”106 In addition to the contractual home-
stead waiver, the contract contained a relatively typical severability provi-
sion.107 The Dallas Court of Appeals concluded that a waiver of
homestead provision in a guaranty was not an essential purpose; the es-
sential purpose was to secure the debt.108 The court of appeals distin-
guished Rogers v. Wolfson109 since it did not contain a severability
provision.110 Consequently, because the unenforceable waiver of home-
stead clause was not a material aspect of the guaranty and the guaranty
did contain a severability provision, the court of appeals concluded that
“the homestead waiver provision was severable” without otherwise af-
fecting the enforceability of the guaranty.111 This case presents a practical
lesson why a standard boilerplate severability provision should be in-
cluded in virtually every contract.
B. INTERPRETATION
Issues on an indemnification provision were raised in ConocoPhillips
Co. v. Noble Energy, Inc.112 This case looks at the effectiveness of an
indemnity provision through various assignments and a bankruptcy. A
predecessor to ConocoPhillips and Noble entered into an exchange
agreement exchanging various oil and gas interests between the two par-
ties which contained an indemnification by each to the other arising out
of any claims for hazardous materials whether or not attributable to the
assignor’s actions and whether “‘prior to, during, or after the period of’
the assignor’s ownership.”113 Similar language was contained in the as-
signment and bill of sale executed pursuant to the exchange agreement.
Eventually, the counterparty to ConocoPhillips filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy, and its assets were purchased out of bankruptcy by an addi-
105. Vince Poscente Int’l, Inc. v. Compass Bank, 460 S.W.3d 211, 217 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2015, no pet.).
106. Id.
107. The severability provision read, in relevant part, as follows: “If any of the provi-
sions of this Guaranty . . . shall, to any extent, be invalid or unenforceable, the remainder
of the provisions of this Guaranty . . . shall not be affected thereby, and every provision of
this Guaranty shall be valid and enforceable to the fullest extent permitted by law.” Id. at
217–18.
108. Id. at 219.
109. 763 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, writ denied).
110. Vince Poscente Int’l, Inc., 460 S.W.3d at 218–19.
111. Id. at 219.
112. 462 S.W.3d 255 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. granted).
113. Id. at 259.
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tional party. The asset purchase and sale agreement and the bankruptcy
plan both contained language that the purchaser agreed to purchase all
assets of the bankruptcy estate but agreed only to assume liabilities listed
on a specific list, which included performing obligations under any execu-
tory contract expressly assumed. An environmental claim arose, and
ConocoPhillips tendered defense and indemnification to Noble as the
successor under the exchange agreement indemnification pursuant to the
asset purchase agreement and a merger.114
Resolution of this case revolved around the interpretation of a specific
provision in the asset purchase and sale agreement, whereby the pur-
chaser agreed to all contracts “in any way associated with the Assets, in-
cluding but not limited to, those Material Contracts (as defined
hereafter)”;115 however, the exchange agreement was not listed as an ex-
cluded asset.116 Noble’s interest ran through the bankruptcy proceedings,
so the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals looked to determine
whether the indemnity provisions of the exchange agreement were an ex-
ecutory contract under the bankruptcy code.117 The indemnity provision
was a two-way indemnity, and, despite the fact that it was contingent, it
was of a material nature, so it met the appropriate conditions to be an
executory contract.118 While the law in this case is not striking in any
sense, it is a good example of the need for specificity in drafting contracts,
since the specific inclusion of the exchange agreement would have elimi-
nated the disputes raised in this case.
V. PURCHASER/SELLER
A. REMEDIES; CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
In Internacional Realty, Inc., v. 2005 RP West, Ltd., the First Houston
Court of Appeals addressed the meaning of a “put remedy” under a
purchase contract.119 Under the agreement at issue, the seller had three
“sole and exclusive remedies”: “(i) terminate this Agreement and there-
upon shall be entitled to the Earnest Money as liquidated damages (and
not as a penalty), or (ii) put the Property to Purchaser and sue Purchaser
for the Purchase Price, or (iii) pursue the remedy of specific performance
of Purchaser’s obligations under the Agreement.”120 The agreement went
on to provide that if the seller “put” the property to the purchaser, the
seller would be entitled to the following:
[A]ll rights of offset against Purchaser . . . to which Seller . . . may be
entitled at law or equity including the Earnest Money and any sums
114. Id. at 261.
115. Id. at 266. While the court did not specify whether the exchange agreement was in
the list of “material contracts,” one would assume it was not.
116. Id. at 266–67.
117. Id. at 271.
118. Id. at 275.
119. Internacional Realty, Inc. v. 2005 RP West, Ltd., 449 S.W.3d 512, 523 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).
120. Id.
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owed by Seller to Purchaser in respect of such construction financing
or otherwise, such right of offset to be applicable against any such
debt and assertable against any subsequent holder thereof.121
After the purchaser failed to comply with its obligations under the
purchase contract, and after numerous extensions and amendments, the
seller ultimately sold the property to a third party at a loss and sued the
purchaser for the difference.122 The purchaser argued that the “put rem-
edy” required the seller to transfer the property to the purchaser and sue
to recover the purchase price, essentially making the put remedy identical
to the “specific performance remedy.”123 The seller argued that the put
remedy allowed them to sell the property to a third party and sue the
purchaser “for the difference between the contract price” and the sum of
the earnest money and the third-party sales price.124 At trial, the jury
found that the seller elected the put remedy, accepted seller’s interpreta-
tion of that remedy, and awarded the seller $4 million in damages.125 The
purchaser appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s
decision that the ambiguity of the put remedy was a question of fact to be
decided by the jury and that the interpretation given by the jury was not
an “unreasonable interpretation as a matter of law.”126 The court of ap-
peals had previously noted that “our legal research has not revealed any
published opinion in any United States jurisdiction construing this lan-
guage.”127 Although this case does not break any new ground in legal
jurisprudence, it is an important reminder for all practitioners regarding
the importance of clear and concise legal drafting. Furthermore, practi-
tioners should either avoid the use of industry vernacular, which is often
subject to many different, and sometimes conflicting, interpretations, or
ensure that the meaning behind such terms are clearly defined within the
body of the contract.
B. WARRANTY OF TITLE; RECOVERY OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES
Stumhoffer v. Perales presents another important reminder to the prac-
titioner with respect to the recovery of attorney fees for defending title
under a General Warranty Deed.128 Perales purchased the property in
question from Stumhoffer and later was sued by a neighboring landowner
who claimed to own by adverse possession a seven-foot strip of land
along the edge of the property, or alternatively, claimed an easement on
the property.129 While the suit with the neighbor was ongoing, Perales
sued Stumhoffer for attorney’s fees incurred defending the suit and the
121. Id.
122. Id. at 520.
123. Id. at 522.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 520.
126. Id. at 526.
127. Id. at 522.
128. See generally Stumhoffer v. Perales, 459 S.W.3d 158 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2015, pet. denied).
129. Id. at 160.
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fair market value of the property (if any) that may be lost under the
suit.130 Perales later prevailed in the suit with the neighbor but continued
to assert that Stumhoffer owned him for the attorney’s fees incurred in
defending the suit.131 Unfortunately, the Fourteenth Houston Court of
Appeals did not agree with Perales’s position and cited multiple cases
supporting their conclusion that, because Perales had prevailed in the
case with the neighbor, there was no failure of title and, without failure of
title, there is no obligation to indemnify.132 The Stumhoffer court went on
to reiterate that, even if there had been a failure of title, Perales would
not have been entitled to attorney’s fees but only to damages incurred as
a result of the “portion of the conveyance that was subject to failure of
title.”133 The court of appeals concluded with an important reminder for
all practitioners that the general rule in Texas is that attorney’s fees in-
curred in prior litigation are generally not recoverable as damages unless
there is an agreement between the parties that specifically provides for
such a recovery.134
C. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT VS. COVENANTS
In Arbor Windsor Court, Ltd. v. Weekley Homes, LP, the Fourteenth
Houston Court of Appeals reminds practitioners of the importance of
clearly distinguishing between conditions precedent and covenants when
drafting legal contracts and that, although helpful, using “magic words”
alone is not sufficient to ensure your intended result.135 As both the ma-
jority and dissenting opinions explained in great detail, as a general rule,
the courts in Texas disfavor conditions precedent.136 If the language is
vague or unclear, the courts will try to find an interpretation that does not
result in the clause being a condition precedent.137 The Arbor Windsor
Court case is noteworthy because, despite the fact that: (i) the parties
used the “magic words” usually only found in a covenant; (ii) the general
aversion of Texas courts to condition precedents; and (iii) the absence of
“magic words” that usually appear in a condition precedent,138 the major-
ity of the court of appeals found that there was no option but to interpret
130. Id.
131. Id. at 164.
132. Id. at 165.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 168; see also Martin-Simon v. Womack, 68 S.W.3d 793, 797 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
135. Arbor Windsor Court, Ltd. v. Weekley Homes, LP, 463 S.W.3d 131, 137 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied). Although courts generally look for the use
of certain magic words such as “if,” “provided that,” or “on condition that,” the use of such
words alone is not dispositive. Id.
136. Id. at 136; see also Criswell v. European Crossroads Shopping Ctr., Ltd., 792
S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex. 1990) (stating “[i]n construing a contract, forfeiture by finding a
condition precedent is to be avoided when another reasonable reading of the contract is
possible.” Id.
137. Arbor Windsor Court, 463 S.W.3d at 136–37.
138. Id. at 137.
406 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 2
the clause at issue as a condition precedent.139
In Arbor Windsor Court, the developer of the subdivision lots eventu-
ally filed a counterclaim against a lot purchaser for breach of contract
because the purchaser failed to purchase lots as provided in the con-
tract.140 Specifically, the parties used the following conflicting language in
a clause: “Seller and purchaser covenant and agree, each with the other,
to give fifteen (15) days’ written notice of any default during which time
same may be cured prior to exercise of any rights or remedies pursuant to
this Agreement.”141 The phrase “covenant and agree” clearly contains
the “magic words” of a covenant, while the phrase “prior to,” without the
“magic words” that are traditionally used in a condition precedent, cer-
tainly could be read as implying a condition precedent.142 Distinguishing
whether the drafters of the contract intended the clause to be a covenant
or a condition precedent is important because if the clause is deemed to
be a condition precedent, the condition must “be met or excused before
the other party’s obligation may be enforced,”143 whereas if the clause is
found to be only a covenant, the remedy for failure to perform is a claim
for damages.144 In Arbor Windsor Court, the court of appeals found that
because the seller failed to provide the required fifteen-day notice to the
purchaser, the condition precedent to seller’s recovery had not occurred
and the seller was not entitled to recover for breach of contract.145
In a well-argued dissent, Justice John Donovan strongly disagrees with
the majority’s position for several reasons. First, Justice Donovan con-
strues the notice provision as a covenant and not a condition on its face
because it does not include the traditional words, and “[i]n determining
whether the language of a contract is a condition precedent, the words of
the contract control.”146 Furthermore, although there is no requirement
that certain phrases be utilized, “their absence is probative of the parties’
intention.”147 Second, Justice Donovan argues that construing the notice
provision as a condition creates a “result which is unreasonable and oper-
ates as forfeiture,”148 which is generally abhorred by the courts and is “to
be avoided when a reasonable [alternative] interpretation exists.”149 In-
terestingly, Justice Donovan relies on the same case as the majority, So-
lar, to support his position that the clause should be interpreted as a
139. Id. at 142.
140. Id. at 134.
141. Id. at 136.
142. Id. at 137–38 (“To glean the parties intent to create a condition precedent, we look
for conditional language such as ‘if,’ ‘provided that,’ or ‘on condition that.’”).
143. Id. at 135.
144. Id. at 137 n.6 (citing Solar Applications Eng’g, Inc. v. T.A. Operating Corp., 327
S.W.3d 104, 108 (Tex. 2010) (citing Reinert v. Lawson, 113 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tex. Civ.
App.—Waco 1938, no writ))).
145. Id. at 142.
146. Id. at 145 (Donovan, J., dissenting) (citing Criswell v. European Crossroads Shop-
ping Ctr., Ltd., 792 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex. 1990)).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 156.
149. Id.
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covenant and not a condition.150
Further, Justice Donovan supports his dissent by including additional
points from the procedural background that highlight why construing the
clause as a condition precedent and not a covenant arguably causes an
absurd result and a windfall to Weekley.151 In his dissent, Justice Dono-
van states that the purchaser Weekley failed to purchase the lots pursuant
to the contract, which resulted in the foreclosure of a loan that the seller,
Arbor, had used to purchase the lots.152 Arbor filed suit against the fore-
closing bank, FETC, in an attempt to prevent the foreclosure, and Week-
ley (who had later purchased the lots at the foreclosure auction)
intervened in Arbor’s suit against FETC in an attempt to quiet title, at
which point Arbor filed a counterclaim against Weekley.153 In Justice
Donovan’s opinion, requiring Arbor to give Weekley fifteen (15) days’
notice to cure, prior to being entitled to relief in a breach of contract suit,
is absurd when (i) Arbor no longer owned the lots and, at that point, the
remedies under the contract were no longer available;154 (ii) there was no
language prohibiting additional remedies not listed in the contract;155 (iii)
even if Weekley had been given notice there was no cure possible by
Weekley;156 and (iv) Weekley intervened in Arbor’s suit against FETC
which provoked Arbor’s counterclaim against Weekley.157 Arguably, the
court of appeals, by interpreting the clause as a condition and not a cove-
150. Id. at 146. In Solar Applications Engineering, Inc. v. T.A. Operating Corp., Solar
Applications Engineering was the general contractor, contracted by T.A. Operating Cor-
poration, the owner, to build a truck stop. Solar Applications Eng’g, Inc. v. T.A. Operating
Corp., 327 S.W. 3d 104, 105 (Tex. 2012). After the truck stop had been substantially com-
pleted, the parties disagreed over the remaining work to be performed and the attachment
of liens to the property by Solar and certain subcontractors. Id. The owner terminated the
contract and refused to pay Solar for the work performed. Id. Solar sued for breach of
contract, and the owner countersued for delay and defective work. Id. The trial court
awarded damages to Solar, and the owner appealed, claiming that Solar failed to provide a
lien-release affidavit, which was a condition precedent to final payment under the contract.
Id. The court of appeals agreed with the owner and reversed the trial court’s judgment. Id.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and found that interpreting the
applicable provision as a condition instead of a covenant would result in a “windfall” to the
owner. Id. at 106, 110. The provision in question stated:
The final Application for Payment shall be accompanied (except as previ-
ously delivered) by: (i) all documentation called for in the Contract Docu-
ments, including but not limited to the evidence of insurance; (ii) consent of
the surety, if any, to final payment; and (ii) complete and legally effective
releases or waivers (satisfactory to [owner]) of all Lien rights arising out of or
Liens filed in Connection with the Work.
Id. at 109. Because the clause did not contain language “traditionally associated with a
condition precedent” and interpreting the clause as a covenant and not a condition prece-
dent avoided forfeiture, which is generally favored by the courts, the supreme court held
that the language in question was a covenant and not a condition precedent. Id. at 109, 112.
151. Arbor Windsor Court, 463 S.W.3d at 148 (Donovan, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 144.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 147.
155. Id. at 152.
156. Id. at 147. The contract provided for the following remedies: “termination of the
Agreement and retainage of the earnest money; extending the time for performance as
may be mutually agreed upon; or enforcing specific performance.” Id. at 148.
157. Id. at 147.
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nant, created an absurd result whereby Arbor was prevented from re-
sponding to Weekley’s petition to intervene because of a contractual
provision not intended to address the situation at hand, which, further-
more, resulted in a windfall for Weekley and forfeiture for Arbor. Re-
gardless of whether you agree with the majority or the dissent of the
court of appeals, the Arbor Windsor Court case is yet another important
reminder for all practitioners on the importance of clear and precise
drafting.
D. ORAL MODIFICATIONS; STATUTE OF FRAUDS
In Petrohawk Properties, the Texarkana Court of Appeals addressed
whether an oral “modification to an agreement subject to the statute of
frauds” was enforceable if the modification was not material to the agree-
ment.158 The issue in Petrohawk Properties dealt with an agreement en-
tered into between Petrohawk Properties, L.P., and several members of
the Jones family at the height of the shale boom in 2008.159 Despite the
intense competition for minerals in the Haynesville Shale at the time, the
Jones family was willing to enter into a lease at a below market rate on
the condition that Petrohawk agreed to lease all of the family’s unleased
acreage in the Haynesville Shale, not to exceed 8,500 acres, provided they
could provide defensible title. At the time, because of the strong interest
in the Haynesville Shale, there was intense competition between oil and
gas companies who were trying to acquire as much acreage as possible.
At the same time, there was limited ability to access the land records at
the county clerk’s office, which resulted in lengthy title search delays.160
The agreement called for the transaction to close on August 15, 2008, and
$10 million was placed in Escrow by Petrohawk to be applied at closing to
the purchase price.161 If the family could not deliver properties without
title defects that exceeded $10 million in value, or if the parties could not
agree on a lease form, Petrohawk could terminate the agreement and
“the escrow would be returned to Petrohawk.”162 If the family delivered
conforming leases exceeding $10 million in value and a lease form was
agreed upon but Petrohawk refused to close, the escrow would be for-
feited as liquidated damages to the family.163
Unfortunately, because of the difficulties of performing the title review
with the limited resources available, it soon became apparent that the
title review would not be completed by the scheduled August 15, 2008
closing date.164 “Petrohawk requested an extension of the closing to Au-
gust 27 to allow more time to complete title work . . . with a second . . .
158. Petrohawk Properties L.P. v. Jones, 455 S.W.3d. 753, 763–64 (Tex. App.—Texar-
kana 2015, pet. dism’d).
159. Id. at 760.
160. Id. at 759.
161. Id. at 760–61.
162. Id. at 761.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 762.
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closing [scheduled] on September 17.”165 Petrohawk and the family
closed on approximately 2,200 mineral acres with a value of $51 million
on August 27.166 At the closing on August 27, the $10 million in the es-
crow was released and counted toward the purchase price. Because of
additional difficulties verifying title, “the second closing [was] postponed
until October 9, with a third, final closing [scheduled for] November
6.”167 On October 7, Petrohawk’s attorney stated in an e-mail to the fam-
ily’s attorney:
Due to unprecedented uncertainty in the capital markets, we are not
in a position to close at this time. When we discussed the second
closing we had no idea we would be faced with these extraordinary
circumstances. We hope your clients understand and we would be
happy to revisit this acreage when things get back nearer to
normal.168
Petrohawk eventually took the position that the agreement had been con-
cluded with the August 27 closing and that the family had until thirty days
after the closing to cure any title defects and have additional properties
included in the close. There was undisputed testimony that Petrohawk
never notified the family of any title defects after the August 27 closing
and that the delay was not due to any title defects but to the inability to
review title because of the limitations at the County Clerk’s office.169 The
family filed suit for breach of contract, seeking damages or specific per-
formance, and at trial, they were awarded damages totaling
$12,389,089.05. Petrohawk appealed, claiming, among other items, that
the statute of frauds barred recovery under the terms of the modified
agreement.170
Petrohawk contended that the oral modification deprived Petrohawk
of the ability to walk away from the purchase for any reason and only be
liable for $10 million in liquidated damages because once the first closing
had occurred, the $10 million was applied to the purchase price and was
no longer available, which was, therefore, a material modification of the
original agreement.171 The court of appeals disagreed and found that the
$10 million was no longer available, not because of the oral modification,
but because of Petrohawk’s partial performance under the agreement and
therefore, it was Petrohawk’s partial performance, not the oral modifica-
tion, that materially altered the contract.172 The court of appeals held that
“the oral modification to conduct multiple closings neither changed the




168. Id. at 762–63.
169. Id. at 763.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 769.
172. Id. at 769–70.
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altered the Agreement itself.”173 The conclusion of the Petrohawk court
is noteworthy because, although many would argue the final holding was
correct based on the equities, the final outcome, as a matter of law, is sure
to be somewhat surprising to many practitioners. It, however, is a good
reminder that, for the benefit of all parties, it is essential to ensure that all
modifications to agreements are codified in writing.
E. EXECUTORY CONTRACTS
In two different cases during the review period the courts examined
what constitutes an executory contract and the obligations of sellers
under such contracts.174 These cases provide several important reminders
to practitioners. The first reminder is that regardless of the terminology
used by the parties, when parties enter into an agreement, or series of
agreements, that collectively provide a buyer the right to immediate pos-
session of the property with an option to purchase the property after
some time, the courts will consider the totality of the circumstances and
will likely consider such an arrangement to be an executory contract.175
The second important practice tip arising from these cases is that execu-
tory contracts, unlike conventional contracts for sale, impose a number of
statutory requirements on the seller, such as the obligation to provide
annual accounting statements under § 5.077 of the Texas Property
Code.176 The requirements imposed on executory contracts by the Texas
Property Code, if not closely adhered to, could be very costly to the
seller. For example, the statutory penalty, under § 5.077 of the Texas
Property Code, for those who fail to provide annual accounting state-
ments is only $100 for each statement if the seller conducts less than two
transactions in a twelve-month period.177 However, as was the case in
Bryant, any seller who conducts two or more executory transactions in a
twelve-month period could be obligated to pay liquidated damages in the
amount of $250 per day for each day after January 31st of the applicable
year that the seller fails to provide the statement up to the fair market
value of the property.178
Whether the penalties contained in § 5.077 are subject to proof of ac-
tual damages pursuant to § 41 of the Civil Practices and Remedies Code
appears to be somewhat undecided at this point. The Texarkana Court of
Appeals, in Bryant, did not specifically address the penalty issue, it simply
overruled the lower courts finding that the contracts were not executory
contracts and remanded the case for further proceedings.179 However, in
a 2005 case, Flores v. Millennium Interests, Ltd., the Texas Supreme Court
173. Id. at 770.
174. See Bryant v. Cady, 445 S.W.3d 815, 817 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.);
Smith v. Davis, 462 S.W.3d 604 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2015, pet. denied).
175. See Bryant, 445 S.W.3d at 821.
176. See id. at 817 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.077 (West 2015)).
177. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.077.
178. Bryant, 445 S.W.3d at 817 n.1.
179. Id. at 823.
2016] Real Property 411
held that although the annual statements provided were deficient, they
were sufficient to substantially comply with the statute and, therefore, no
penalties were awardable.180 The supreme court, however, went on to
clearly state that “the Legislature intended for the ‘liquidated damages’
of section 5.077(c) to be a penalty and did not intend that a purchaser
prove actual damages as a predicate to their recovery.”181 As a result of
the first two findings, the supreme court stated it was unnecessary to an-
swer the third statement posed by the Fifth Circuit, which specifically
asked if the definition of “exemplary damages” under Chapter 41 of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code included the definition of “liqui-
dated damages” pursuant to § 5.077 of the Texas Property Code and,
therefore, whether any recovery under § 5.077 required a purchaser to
comply with § 41.003, which effectively requires the establishment of ac-
tual damages for the recovery of exemplary damages.182 Section 41.002
further provides that the provisions of Chapter 41 “prevail over all other
laws to the extent of any conflict,” with the exception of certain enumer-
ated statues, which do not include § 5.077 of the Texas Property Code.183
Despite the holding of the supreme court in Flores, the Tyler Court of
Appeals recently addressed executory contracts in Smith v. Davis and
clearly held that Chapter 41 of the Civil Practices and Remedies Code is
applicable to a claim for failure to provide the annual accounting state-
ment and that liquidated damages under § 5.077(a) of the Texas Property
Code can only be recovered when actual damages are incurred.184 The
Texas Supreme Court denied the petition to review Smith, leaving the
issue unsettled at this point in time.185
VI. LEASES; LANDLORD/TENANT
A. JURISDICTION; VENUE SELECTION
In the case In re Group 1 Realty, Inc., the El Paso Court of Appeals
clarified for practitioners any perceived conflict between the mandatory
venue selection provision for major transactions found in § 15.020 of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and § 15.0115 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code that “mandates . . . a suit between a land-
lord and a tenant arising under a lease must be brought in the county in
which the real property is located.”186
The case involved a lease and sublease that contained an option to
purchase the property in question.187 Although the leases did not contain
a venue selection clause, the purchase agreement, which qualified as a
180. Flores v. Millennium Interests, Ltd., 185 S.W.3d 427, 429 (Tex. 2005).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 434.
183. Id. at 439 (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE. ANN. § 41.002).
184. Smith v. Davis, 462 S.W.3d 604, 613 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2015, pet. denied).
185. See id.
186. In re Grp. 1 Realty, Inc., 441 S.W.3d 469, 472 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.)
(citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §15.020 (West 2015)).
187. Id. at 470–71.
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major transaction pursuant to the terms of § 15.020 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code and was attached to the leases and incorpo-
rated therein, did contain such a clause.188 The court of appeals correctly
held that a venue selection clause satisfying the requirements of § 15.020
controls over all other venue selection clauses contained in Title 2 of the
Civil Practice and Remedies Code.189
In Mohammed v. D. 1050 W. Rankin, Inc., the First Houston Court of
Appeals once again addressed the jurisdiction of the justice court and
once again reiterated that “landlord-tenant disputes about possession fall
squarely within the justice court’s jurisdiction.”190 The court of appeals
also addressed the perceived inconsistency between the Texas Supreme
Court’s new rules for justice court cases, which became effective on Au-
gust 31, 2013, specifically, Rule 510, which governs evictions and provides
for an appellate timetable of five days, and Rule 506, which governs jus-
tice cases in general and provides for an appellate timetable of twenty-
one days.191 The court of appeals held that the five-day time period out-
lined in Rule 510.9 applied, regardless of the fact that the judgment at
issue was an amended judgment and was not specifically addressed by
Rule 510.9.192
B. FORCIBLE DETAINER
As in previous years, a number of cases dealt with forcible detainer
actions. In Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation v. Pham, Freddie
Mac, the record owner, appealed the county court’s decision that res judi-
cata barred a third forcible detainer action against tenants at suffer-
ance.193 This case is notable because the Fourteenth Houston Court of
Appeals agreed with Freddie Mac that res judicata did not automatically
bar the action at hand because a “new and independent cause of action
for forcible detainer arises each time a person refuses to surrender pos-
session of real property after a person entitled to possession of the prop-
erty delivers a proper written notice to vacate.”194 Although the court of
appeals ultimately affirmed the county court’s decision because Freddie
Mac had failed to present appropriate evidence in its response to Pham’s
motion for summary judgment that a new, proper written notice to vacate
had been delivered, this case should give lenders everywhere comfort that
they will not be barred from bringing a forcible detainer action by res
judicata.195
188. Id. at 471.
189. Id. at 473.
190. Mohammed v. D. 1050 W. Rankin, Inc., 464 S.W.3d 737, 741 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).
191. Id. at 742.
192. Id. at 743.
193. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Pham, 449 S.W.3d 230, 232 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.).
194. Id. at 235–36.
195. See id. at 235.
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C. STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The courts addressed the statute of frauds in a surprising number of
cases during the review period. The First Houston Court of Appeals also
addressed the issue in Mohammed. In this case, the tenant continued to
pay the original lease amount of $1,800 a month for over seven years
after the date the original lease expired.196 The lease contained two five-
year extension options.197 The first extension option provided for
monthly rent of $2,000 a month for two years and $2,200 a month for
three years.198 The second extension option provided for market rent on
similar properties. The tenant argued that he had accepted the options
and lawfully inhabited the premises. The court of appeals, however, reit-
erated that “[a] party to an option contract may enforce that option by
strict compliance with the terms of the option.”199 Because there was
nothing in writing produced at trial evidencing the landlord’s intent to
modify the rent payable under the option, the court of appeals correctly
held that the tenant was simply a month-to-month tenant at will who had
lawful possession “until [the landlord] notified him to vacate the
premises.”200
Courts also addressed the statute of frauds in Rossman v. Bishop Colo-
rado Retail Plaza, L.P.201 Rossman was a complicated case involving a
lessor and the purchaser of a lessee’s assets after foreclosure by a bank,
which presents several very important practice pointers.202 In Rossman,
the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a bill of sale, signed only by the
bank and not the purchaser, whereby the bank transferred the foreclosed
assets to the purchaser that included the statement, “All leases including
ground leases,” did not provide sufficient information to satisfy the stat-
ute of frauds because there was no way for someone, even if they were
familiar with the area, “to locate the [transferred] premises with any rea-
sonable certainty.”203 The lessor then claimed that three exceptions to the
statute of frauds existed (delivery and acceptance, equitable estoppel, and
performance) because the purchaser then pledged the leases in question
to a bank as collateral to secure a loan. Unfortunately for the lessor, the
original security agreement, prior to the foreclosure, again failed to ade-
quately identify the property and simply listed categories of property, one
of which was “[a]ll leases, including ground leases.”204 The court of ap-
peals held that this description alone “could not create a security interest
in the [L]eases.”205
196. Mohammed, 464 S.W.3d at 740.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 745.
200. Id. at 747.
201. 455 S.W.3d 797, 808 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied).
202. See id. at 800.
203. Id. at 808.
204. Id. at 809.
205. Id.
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In addition to ensuring that all contracts purporting to transfer an in-
terest in real property contain legal descriptions sufficient to allow the
property to be identified, the Rossman case contains an additional
pointer for the practitioner: the importance of ensuring that a debtor has
the rights to encumber the underlying collateral.206 Because the leases in
question prohibited the lessee from encumbering its interest in the leases,
the Rossman court held that even if the description in the security instru-
ment was sufficient to create a security interest, no security interest could
attach and the leases could not have been transferred to the purchaser
because the terms of the leases themselves prohibited such an action.207
D. BREACH OF CONTRACT; DISCHARGE OF OBLIGATION TO PERFORM
Another case of interest to the practitioner is Archer v. DDK Holdings
LLC.208 In this case, the landlord under a master lease transferred the
premises without giving the tenant notice of the intent to transfer the
premises and the option to purchase the premises pursuant to the terms
of the master lease.209 The tenant alleged breach of contract. Unfortu-
nately for the tenant, because the tenant had previously been notified by
the landlord that they were in breach of the repair obligations under the
lease and had failed to comply with the landlord’s demand to perform the
requested repairs, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals found that,
as result of the tenant’s initial breach, the landlord’s performance was
excused and the landlord was not required to give the tenant the option
to purchase the premises.210 Although in this case it is unclear whether
the favorable outcome for the landlord was mere luck or crafty counsel,
the case represents an important reminder for all practitioners that, as the
Archer court stated, “when one party materially breaches a contract, the
other party to the contract is discharged or excused from further
performance.”211
VII. CONSTRUCTION MATTERS
A. CERTIFICATE OF MERIT STATUTE
In Childress Engineering Services, Inc., v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Company, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals once again addressed the
Certificate of Merit Statute and concluded, yet again, that a certificate of
merit was not necessary for a breach of contract suit.212 In the Childress
case, Nationwide Insurance Company, as subrogee for Meritage Homes
of Texas, sued Childress Engineering, alleging breach of contract for fail-
206. Id. at 810.
207. Id.
208. 463 S.W.3d 597 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
209. Id. at 610.
210. Id. at 611.
211. See id. at 610.
212. Childress Eng’g Servs., Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 456 S.W.3d. 725, 730 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2015, no pet.).
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ure to defend and indemnify Meritage Homes of Texas in a suit by a
homebuyer who “sued for negligence, gross negligence, breach of con-
tract, breach of warranty, violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act,
fraud, fraud in the inducement, and fraud in a real estate transaction,
based on an allegedly defective foundation” poured by Childress under a
contract with Meritage.213 The indemnification clause in question was an
absolute obligation “REGARDLESS OF CAUSE OR ANY FAULT OR
NEGLIGENCE OF [MERITAGE],” and the court of appeals found that
the breach of contract claim was based solely on Childress’s failure to
“comply with a contractual obligation, not a specific act, error, or omis-
sion performed in its provision of engineering services.”214 As a result,
Nationwide was not required to present a certificate of merit pursuant to
the requirements of § 150.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code.215
B. BREACH OF CONTRACT VS. NEGLIGENCE
In Chapman Custom Homes, Inc. v. Dallas Plumbing Company, the
landowner and general contractor sued the plumbing subcontractor, al-
leging that the subcontractor failed to install the hot water system prop-
erly, which resulted in water damage to the house.216 The Dallas Court of
Appeals affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the plumbing con-
tractor because: (i) “the homeowner did not have a negligence claim be-
cause it ‘did not allege violation of a [tort duty] independent of the
contract’”;217 and (ii) “did not have a contract claim because [the home-
owner] was not a party to the plumbing subcontract.”218 The basis of the
court of appeals decision was the economic loss rule, which “generally
precludes recovery in tort for economic losses resulting from a party’s
failure to perform under a contract when the harm consists only of the
economic loss of a contractual expectancy.”219 The Texas Supreme Court
relied on a 1947 case, Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Scharrenbeck, which
involved a very similar fact pattern (a contractor had been hired to repair
a water heater, and the work was performed so poorly that it ultimately
caused the house to burn down) to reverse the court of appeals.220 In
Montogomery Ward, the Texas Supreme Court held that every contract
carries with it a common law implied “duty to perform with care [and]
skill.”221 In Chapman Custom Homes, Inc., the supreme court found that
213. Id. at 726.
214. Id. at 729.
215. Id.
216. Chapman Custom Homes, Inc. v. Dall. Plumbing Co., 445 S.W.3d 716, 717 (Tex.
2014) (per curiam).
217. Id. (quoting Chapman Custom Homes, Inc. v. Dall. Plumbing Co., 446 S.W.3d 29,
35 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013), rev’d, 445 S.W.3d 716 (Tex. 2014)).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 718.
220. Id. (citing Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Scharrenbeck, 204 S.W.2d 508, 510 (Tex.
1947)).
221. Montogmery Ward, 204 S.W.2d at 510.
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the homeowner did have a negligence claim “[b]ecause the negligent per-
formance of a contract that proximately injures a non-contracting party’s
property” is sufficient to support a negligence claim.222 The supreme
court went on to state that the economic loss rule “does not bar all tort
claims arising out of a contractual setting.”223
VIII. TITLE MATTERS
A. ADVERSE POSSESSION/TITLE DISPUTES
In the area of adverse possession, the courts essentially reviewed long
time requirements, though in odd circumstances. In Wells v. Johnson, the
Amarillo Court of Appeals confirmed the prejudice in the courts against
finding adverse possession as a result of casual fences and cattle graz-
ing.224 In this case, the statements by the claimants and the placement of
a fence were not enough to meet the adversity and hostility requirements,
and the grazing of the cattle was insufficient to support consistent and
continuous possession.225 Property needs to be designedly enclosed by a
fence in connection with adverse possession, and an existing casual fence
was insufficient for that purpose.226 In addition, there was some evidence
that the use was not continuous.227 The repair and maintenance of the
casual fence did not change a casual fence into a designed enclosure.228
This property was bordered by the Red River, which is notorious for
changing riverbeds and boundaries. Perhaps the giveaway in the opinion
was when the court of appeals reversed and rendered the finding that the
“mere grazing of livestock to show adverse use” was insufficient alone.229
Yet another case, Kings River Trail Association, Inc. v. Pinehurst Trail
Holdings, LLC, identified another generally accepted point that joint use
is not enough to establish adverse use under the limitations statute.230
This was a case involving use by members of a property association of
property dedicated for golf course use but which had not been developed.
The association built and maintained trails, but there was no indication of
an exclusion appropriation.231 The First Houston Court of Appeals held
that “[m]ere occupancy of land without any intent to appropriate it does
not support adverse possession.”232
Finally, in Villarreal v. Guerra, the San Antonio Court of Appeals vis-
ited the difficulty of establishing adverse possession in a co-tenancy situa-
222. Chapman Custom Homes, Inc., 445 S.W.3d at 717.
223. Id. at 718.
224. Wells v. Johnson, 443 S.W.3d 479, 480–90 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2014, pet. denied).
225. Id. at 495–96.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 496.
228. Id. at 490.
229. Id.
230. Kings River Trail Ass’n, Inc. v. Pinehurst Trail Holdings, L.L.C., 447 S.W.3d 439,
445 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).
231. Id.
232. Id.
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tion.233 In this case, the ten-year statute was satisfied, and the acts were
sufficiently adverse, open, and hostile to establish adverse possession.234
An interesting twist in the analysis was that possession of land following
an oral gift was adverse, not permissive, because a gift of property vio-
lated the statute of frauds and was unenforceable.235 This is a narrow
analysis because it would have been as easy to find an oral gift failing as a
deed to be permissive. In this case, the recipient of the gift did place a
lock on the gate and gave no one else a key. Additionally, the property
was enclosed by a natural barrier—thick thorny bushes. The recipient of
the gift spent forty years improving the property, including creating
ponds, clearing land, building a windmill and shed, and bringing utilities
to an already existing house. The issue was precipitated when the tax of-
fice declined to accept tax payment from the recipient of the gift. One
other useful point made by the court of appeals was that the term “hos-
tile” did not require true adversity or hostility to one another, but that
the claim of title be inconsistent with the rights of the true owner.236 It
took forty years of exclusive occupation and history of improvements to
establish adverse possession.237
B. DEEDS AND CONVEYANCES
The Texas Supreme Court weighed in on deed interpretation in Strib-
ling v. Millican DPC Partners, LP.238 The case was a boundary dispute
and included questions of adverse possession, but the supreme court did
not reach the adverse possession issue because of its handling of the deed
interpretation.239 In particular, the dispute was over a 34.28 acre tract. A
1945 deed in the chain of title conveyed 202 acres, which were described
by metes and bounds, and which included the 34.28 acres in question.240
A 1973 deed of a significantly larger tract included a parcel referenced as
a 202-acre tract out of the Thomas Henry survey and described in the
1945 deed. That is, the general description in the 1973 deed included the
entire 202 acres, including the 34.28 acres. The 1973 metes and bounds
description, however, did not contain the 34.28 acres, and therefore, the
specific description was inconsistent with the general description. There
was additionally an indication that the metes and bounds area was 1,167
acres, which was described by the metes and bounds in the 1973 deed.241
Interestingly, neither party contended the deed was ambiguous thereby
giving the supreme court license to construe the deed as a matter of
233. Villareal v. Guerra, 446 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet.
denied).
234. Id. at 414.
235. See id. at 411.
236. Id. at 413.
237. Id. at 408.
238. 458 S.W.3d 17 (Tex. 2015).
239. Id. at 18.
240. Id. at 19.
241. Id. at 20.
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law.242 In so finding, the supreme court pronounced the following general
principles: (1) “[A]ll parts of a written instrument must be harmonized
and given effect, if possible, but, in case of a conflict, more specific provi-
sions will control over general expressions”; (2) when the specific descrip-
tion is clear, there is “no necessity for invoking the aid of the general
description”; (3) “[m]ere inconsistencies between the metes and bounds
and the general description do not themselves render the metes and
bounds doubtful”; and (4) “a reference to a prior deed does not prevail
over a clearly contrary metes-and-bounds description.”243
Pointing out the importance of specific detailed language in a deed, the
Eastland Court of Appeals in Butler v. Horton, reviewed the four corners
of a deed to determine the actual intent of the parties, disregarding any
arbitrary rules.244 The deed in question reserved to the grantor one-half
of the usual one-eighth royalty. Further, it stated that the “heirs and as-
signs, shall be entitled to one-half of any bonus payments or delay rent-
als,” and the grantor “shall be entitled, free of cost, to one-half of the
royalty on said minerals, as provided.”245 The court of appeals felt that
this was a reservation for a fraction of a royalty rather than a fractional
royalty.246
A “fraction of royalty” provision provides for a fractional share of
the royalty that is provided in a lease; the interest is not fixed, but
rather floats in accordance with the amount of royalty provided in
the lease. A “fractional royalty” interest, on the other hand, remains
fixed regardless of the amount of royalty provided for in a future
lease.247
In this case, the court of appeals found that the noted language intended
to reserve a fraction of the royalty and not a specific amount.248
In Cole v. McWillie, dealing with capacity and voidable versus void, the
Eastland Court of Appeals found that a lack of authority under a power
of attorney resulted in a deed that was only voidable and must be set
aside within the time provided by the statute of limitations.249 A voidable
deed is effective and valid but voidable at the election of the principal.250
In this case, a principal had executed a power of attorney at the point in
time when she was competent, but later became incompetent prior to the
time of the execution of the deed. The power of attorney was not durable,
and the principal had died in 1986. An important fact in this case was that
242. Id.
243. Id. at 20, 22–23 (quoting U.S. Enters., Inc. v. Dauley, 535 S.W.2d 623, 630–31 (Tex.
1976), and Cullers v. Platt, 16 S.W. 1003, 1005 (Tex. 1891)).
244. Butler v. Horton, 447 S.W.3d 514, 517 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2014, no pet.).
245. Id. at 516–17.
246. Id. at 515.
247. Id. at 517–18 (citing Moore v. Noble Energy, Inc. 374 S.W. 3d 644, 647–48 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 2012, no pet.)).
248. Id. at 515.
249. Cole v. McWillie, 464 S.W.3d 896, 898, 904 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, pet.
denied).
250. Id. at 902.
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the power of attorney was effective when originally executed, and the
lack of capacity arose thereafter.251 The court of appeals found that the
power of attorney did not “automatically terminate[ ] upon the disability
of the principal.”252 While a durable power of attorney allows continued
authority to execute the contract or deed by the agent, the lack thereof
did not provide for immediate termination upon incapacity of a princi-
pal.253 Interestingly, the court of appeals distinguished the death of a
principal from an incapacity.254 “[T]he benefited party can secure the ad-
vantage of a good bargain by ratifying the contract or he can relieve him-
self of a bad bargain by electing to disavow the agreement.”255 The court
of appeals also applied a standard statute of limitations that seems some-
what inconsistent with the issue of incapacity, which would typically toll
limitations.256 In this case, it probably was not relevant because the prin-
cipal had died and more than four years had passed since the death. Also,
procedural defects in asserting the avoidance of limitations may have pre-
vented the court from fully considering the incapacity issue.
In another deed interpretation case, Union Railroad Company v.
Ameriton Properties Inc., the First Houston Court of Appeals held that
the term “right-of-way” as used in a deed “[did] not necessarily define or
limit the estate conveyed.”257 In fact, the term “right-of-way” often has
two different uses: sometimes used to describe a right belonging to a
party or a right of passage over a tract; at other times used to describe a
strip of land that the railroad company takes to construct a roadway.258 In
this case, Union Pacific laid tracks within the fifty-foot wide strip of land
but subsequently removed the tracts and no longer used the property for
railroad purposes. In the deed itself, the grantor reserved the right to cut
timber upon the tract given for the right of way. Using the four corners
rule and seeking to determine the intent of the parties, the court of ap-
peals focused on the reservation of timber rights as unnecessary to be
conveyed if only an easement or right of way.259 The court of appeals
found that the deed conveyed a fee simple estate.260
In this case, one of the issues arose because the deed was apparently
provided “during a condemnation proceeding and the seller hoped to
benefit from the presence of [the] railway.”261 Accordingly, the deed
could only convey a right-of-way easement.262 In an odd twist, though,
the granting language of the right of way deed, which the court of appeals
251. Id. at 898.
252. Id. at 901.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 901–02.
255. Id. at 902.
256. See id. at 903.
257. Union R.R. Co. v. Ameriton Properties Inc., 448 S.W.3d 671, 679 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 684–85.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 686.
262. Id. at 680.
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found to grant a fee simple, also had a condition that the railroad—on or
before the first day of January 18, 1981—must build a railway and run
cars to the Texas and New Orleans railroad depot. In such case, the deed
of conveyance would be absolute. Because the railroad failed to put on
evidence that that had occurred, the court of appeals found that even
though the deed was intended to convey fee simple, there was no evi-
dence that the conditions had been fulfilled, and therefore, the property
had not vested in the railroad.263 Thus, the case turned not on a fee sim-
ple versus easement but on a condition.
C. EASEMENTS
The Texas Supreme Court brought its wisdom to bear in an extremely
important decision regarding easements, Hamrick v. Ward.264 In this de-
cision, the supreme court held that implied easements fell within only two
categories: necessity and prior use.265 For an owner to claim a roadway
easement to a landlocked property, one that was previously unified with a
larger parcel, that landowner must pursue a necessity easement.266 While
prior use easements may be appropriate for improvements to a land-
locked property, such as utility lines, in order to establish an implied
easement for roadway access, a necessity easement is required.267 Thus,
there is a higher burden, and an easement by necessity requires: “(1)
unity of ownership of the alleged dominant and servient estates prior to
severance; (2) the claimed access is a necessity and not a mere conve-
nience; and (3) the necessity existed at the time the two estates were
severed.”268
To the contrary, a prior use easement only requires the following:
(1) unity of ownership of the alleged dominant and servient estates
prior to severance; (2) the use of the claimed easement was open and
apparent at the time of severance; (3) the use was continuous, so the
parties must have intended that its use pass by grant; and (4) the use
must be necessary to the use of the dominant estate.269
This is a lesser standard and allows the court to look into the circum-
stances and the obvious intent of the parties from the transaction. Be-
cause a roadway is deemed to be a much more significant intrusion, it
must meet the higher standard.270 In this case, the Wards asserted their
right using the prior use doctrine, and the trial court awarded them an
implied easement. The supreme court, after review of the law and its
holding regarding easement by necessity, remanded the case to permit
263. Id. at 687.
264. 446 S.W.3d 377, 377 (Tex. 2013).
265. Id. at 379.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 382.
269. Id. at 383.
270. Id. at 384.
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the Wards to pursue a theory of easement by necessity.271 Rather than
punishing the Wards for failure to use the correct theory, the supreme
court determined that, because of the clarification of the law, it had the
authority and power to remand for a new trial in the interest of justice,
consistent with the holding of the court.272 In particular, the supreme
court effectively overruled prior case law established by Bickler v.
Bickler.273
Also, in an interesting twist on an easement by necessity, the El Paso
Court of Appeals found that a license from a third party to cross other
land did not undermine an easement by necessity.274
D. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, CONDOMINIUMS AND OWNERS
ASSOCIATION
Two courts of appeals decisions dealt with Chapter 209 of the Texas
Property Code and Property Associations, now often called common in-
terest communities. In Storck v. Tres Lagos Property Owners Association,
Inc., the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that a provision in the home-
owners’ association bylaws was ineffective to the extent that it disquali-
fied a property owner from voting in a property owners’ association
election of board members or on any other matter concerning rights or
responsibilities of the owner.275 Thus, the bylaws provided that if the
homeowner was behind in dues, that homeowner lost their right to vote.
However, Texas Property Code §§ 209.002(4) and 209.0059(a) statutorily
provide that such a provision is ineffective.276
In Park v. Escalera Ranch Owners’ Association, Inc., the Austin Court
of Appeals acknowledged that a suit against a homeowner requires that
notice first be given to the owner.277 This is a mandatory provision under
the Texas Property Code § 209.006(a).278 The provision, however, is not
jurisdictional, and the appropriate response for a homeowner would have
been a plea in abatement.279 If the abatement is not requested, the home-
owner has waived the mandatory non-jurisdictional statutory require-
ment.280 The lesson here, for any attorney representing a homeowner that
has been sued without notice and that desires to address the alleged in-
fraction, is to file a plea in abatement. In this case, the infraction involved
installation of unapproved windows.
271. Id. at 385.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 377 (citing Bickler v. Bickler, 403 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. 1966)).
274. Jentsch v. Lake Road Welding Co., 450 S.W.3d 597, 601 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014,
no pet.).
275. Stork v. Tres Lagos Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., 442 S.W.3d 730, 731 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2014, pet. denied).
276. Id. at 236.
277. Park v. Escalera Ranch Owners’ Ass’n, Inc., 457 S.W.3d 571, 576 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2015, no pet.).
278. Id. at 583.
279. Id. at 590.
280. Id.
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E. HOMESTEAD
In connection with homestead issues, most of the cases during the Sur-
vey period dealt with home equity loans. In particular, parties continued
to challenge home equity loans for various violations of the Constitution,
and, as lending practices have tightened, new claims have become less
successful. For example, in Santiago v. NovaStar Mortgage, Inc., the Dal-
las Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether or not the discovery
rule might toll a four-year statute of limitations.281 The court noted that
the injury arising from an alleged constitutional violation accrues at the
point of the closing of the loan. In this case, there was an alleged forged
affidavit that had been recorded. The court of appeals found that (i)
“[t]he affidavit was a matter of public record”; (ii) the forgery was not
inherently undiscoverable; and (iii) the limitations ran from the date of
the closing.282
In The Bank of New York Mellon v. Daryapayma, the borrower raised
a creative argument that a mortgage that was being paid off in the context
of a home equity loan refinance should be added to the amount of the
home equity loan for purposes of determining the 80% market value limi-
tation.283 This is a nonsensical argument and can be easily eliminated
from consideration by a simple reading of the constitutional language.
However, by some means, the borrower had prevailed at the trial court
level. The Dallas Court of Appeals took care of matters and reversed the
trial court decision.284
Also, in Rivera v. Hernandez, the El Paso Court of Appeals noted that
a homestead interest did not change separate property into community
property.285 A homestead interest is an intangible interest that may exist
in separate or community property.286 This is a rather straightforward
concept in Texas law, but many lenders require both borrowers to be in
record title. If the property is one spouse’s separate property, and both
husband and wife may be borrowers, then both may be required to exe-
cute a deed of trust due to the homestead interest and requirements of
the Family Code.287 This does not change the characterization of the
property.288 It is specifically permissible and appropriate under Texas
law. Yet, lenders continue to require borrowers to place their spouse in
title, sometimes negatively affecting or otherwise altering characteriza-
281. Santiago v. NovaStar Mortgage, Inc., 443 S.W.3d 462, 469 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2014), overruled in part by Wood v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 59 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 877 (Tex.
2016).
282. Id. at 473.
283. Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Daryapayma, 457 S.W.3d 618, 620–21 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2015, pet. denied).
284. Id. at 619.
285. Rivera v. Hernandez, 441 S.W.3d 413, 420 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, pet. denied).
286. Id. (citing Denmon v. Atlas Leasing, L.L.C., 285 S.W.3d 591, 595 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2009, no pet.)).
287. See id. (citing Leighton v. Leighton, 921 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1996, no writ.); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.001 (West 2015).
288. Rivera, 441 S.W.3d at 420.
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tion of property in cases where property is separate. This is simply an
incorrect and inappropriate practice by the lending community.
Finally, Wassmer v. Hopper recognized that a surviving spouse, even
though not receiving homestead property upon the death of her husband
due to the laws of intestacy, still had a surviving spouse homestead inter-
est in the property and may remain in and occupy that property until she
moves or dies.289 An independent administrator and the step children
were not entitled to partition or to otherwise cause a transfer of the prop-
erty interest, but rather were subject to the widow’s exclusive right of use
and possession when she “elected to maintain the home as her constitu-
tional homestead.”290
F. TITLE INSURANCE
There were three title insurance related cases during the Survey period,
though essentially addressing the duties of the escrow agent. As is a com-
mon practice in Texas, a title company or escrow agent closes the real
estate transaction and is an agent for the issuance of title insurance by a
title insurance underwriter. Separate from claims that an insured may
have under the title insurance policy, sometimes there are claims brought
directly against the escrow agent in connection with a real estate closing.
In Dailey v. Thorpe, the First Houston Court of Appeals limited “[a]n
escrow officer’s fiduciary duties to the parties to [the] real estate transac-
tion.”291 In this case, the closed real estate transaction was a seller-fi-
nanced real estate sale that subsequently defaulted. Because the sellers
did not receive full payment from the purchasers, and the event occurred
after closing, the seller alleged a breach of fiduciary duty on the part of
the escrow agent. The facts were somewhat specific in this case as the
escrow officer was the niece of the purchaser. Many title companies do
not let escrow officers close transactions for relatives because of the diffi-
culties that may arise like this. It, however, is not a prohibited act.
In IQ Holdings, Inc. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Company, the First
Houston Court of Appeals found that the Schedule B exception in a title
insurance policy for a condominium declaration was sufficient to except
all title risks arising from that instrument, including a right of first re-
fusal.292 The court of appeals also restated the title insurance principle
that the agent did not have a duty to obtain good title, nor did he or she
have to conduct a title search for the benefit of the potentially insured.293
Rather, such search was for the benefit of issuing title insurance and for
289. Wassmer v. Hopper, 463 S.W.3d 513, 530 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.).
290. Id. at 525, 530.
291. Dailey v. Thorpe, 445 S.W.3d 785, 789 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no
pet.).
292. IQ Holdings, Inc. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 451 S.W.3d 861, 873 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.).
293. Id. at 871.
424 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 2
its own benefit in underwriting the transaction.294 Of interest, the court of
appeals also pointed out that it was the seller’s duty, not the escrow
agent’s duty, to inform the prospective buyer of transfer restrictions im-
posed by the association.295
Finally, in Flagstar Bank, FSB v. Walker, the Dallas Court of Appeals
addressed a very complicated multi-party scenario but ultimately found
that no fiduciary duty existed between a title examining entity and a
warehouse lender.296 The diagram below illustrates the multiple parties,
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Excel had an escrow relationship with LSD, and LSD subcontracted
the title work to CTS. CTS was also an agent for First American Title
Insurance Company and had generally solicited title and escrow work
from a number of entities, including Flagstar.297 CTS did issue a commit-
ment on behalf of First American and, for an unknown reason, Flagstar
wired funds directly to CTS. CTS kept a fee for examination and issuance
of the title insurance and then transferred the funds to LSD for handling
the closing. LSD failed to pay off the underlying liens.298 Thus, obviously
LSD did not have the funds to cover the loss, and Flagstar ultimately
looked to CTS for recovery.
Flagstar failed on each liability theory, including fiduciary duty, bail-
294. Id. (citing Hahn v. Love, 394 S.W.3d 14, 35 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012,
pet. denied)).
295. Id. at 873.
296. Flagstar Bank, FSB v. Walker, 451 S.W.3d 490, 504 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no
pet.).
297. Id. at 495.
298. Id. at 496.
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ment, and negligence.299 As a preliminary matter, the court of appeals did
find that Flagstar, the warehouse lender, had standing to bring a claim
but found no escrow agreement between Flagstar and CTS.300 Part of the
difficulty from Flagstar’s position was significant subjective understand-
ings and assumptions and a failure to provide specific instructions to CTS.
While the scenario where the escrow agent and the title agent are sepa-
rate entities is the exception rather than the rule in Texas, this does
demonstrate the risk of an entity providing only title work when it also
handles the lender funds. Either the lender funds should have gone
through the escrow agent with a remitter to CTS or the relationship be-
tween Flagstar and CTS should have been specifically set out and estab-
lished by agreement.301 In the absence thereof, Flagstar was not entitled
to presume that CTS had a fiduciary duty to it.302
G. Lis Pendens
In an interesting case out of the First Houston Court of Appeals, the
court further complicated, and possibly confused, the issues of lis
pendens. Lis pendens strictly create notice of a lawsuit that claims an in-
terest in real property.303 Lis pendens are often litigated in the context of
a motion to cancel or expunge because of some failure to claim an inter-
est in real property.304 Notices of lis pendens, however, have uniformly
been held as privileged documents, though often subject to abusive prac-
tices.305 In James v. Calkins, the underlying lawsuit was a fraud claim.306
The parties also asserted that the filing of the lis pendens constituted a
fraudulent lien against the property pursuant to Chapter 12 of the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Chapter 12 defines a lien as “a claim
in property for the payment of a debt and includes a security interest.”307
Literally, then, a lis pendens would not constitute a lien. In James, the
court of appeals, however, specifically held that a lis pendens may form
the basis of a fraudulent lien claim.308 The court of appeals seemed very
ready to consider a fraudulent lis pendens as a violation of the statute, but
in this case, the evidence was insufficient to show that “[the plaintiff], or
her lawyers, believe[d] that the lis pendens [was] fraudulent.”309 The
plaintiffs asserted grounds that the filing of the lis pendens was an “exer-
cise of the right of free speech, . . . [and a] right of association,” but the
299. Id. at 498–506.
300. Id. at 497–98.
301. See id. at 499–504.
302. See id.
303. James v. Calkins, 446 S.W.3d 135, 150 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet.
denied).
304. See, e.g., id. at 140; David Powers Homes, Inc. v. M.L. Rendleman Co., 355 S.W.3d
327, 340 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.).
305. See, e.g., Prappas v. Meyerland Cmty. Improvement Ass’n, 795 S.W.2d 794, 797
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ. denied).
306. James, 446 S.W.3d at 139–40.
307. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 12.001(3) (West 2015).
308. James, 446 S.W.3d at 150.
309. Id.
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court of appeals did not reach those grounds in view of the evidentiary
failure.310 It does not appear that any of the parties raised the point of the
lis pendens being a privileged document. The abusive use of lis pendens
continues to be an area deserving of clarification and possible legislation.
IX. MISCELLANEOUS
A. NUISANCE/TRESPASS
The Texas Supreme Court twice addressed trespass during the Survey
period. First, it addressed the elements of trespass and, in a subsequent
opinion, addressed the measure of damages. Both of these are issues
which had been previously unaddressed by the supreme court. Accord-
ingly, in Environmental Processing Systems, L.C. v. FPL Farming, Ltd.,
the Texas Supreme Court, as a matter of first impression, held that a lack
of consent was an element of the owner’s trespass cause of action and
that the owner thus had the burden of proof.311 This specifically over-
ruled a number of court of appeals opinions holding that consent was an
affirmative defense. This was an interesting case in that it had been to the
supreme court previously and then remanded to the appellate court. The
trial court tried the case before a jury, and the trial court, based on the
jury’s verdict, found that there was not a trespass by FPL.312
By way of background, FPL was a rice farming entity that owned prop-
erty next to a five-acre tract owned by Environmental Processing Systems
(EPS) where EPS had constructed and operated a wastewater disposal
facility. EPS had a permit to operate the injection wells but had signifi-
cantly increased the depth and volume of the wells it was operating. FPL
contended that the deep subsurface wastewater had migrated into the
water table underneath FPL’s property, damaging that water and thus
trespassing against FPL. The jury did not find a trespass.313 The jury
charge to find trespass included an instruction that there must be an act
“without the consent of [the plaintiffs].”314
The court of appeals affirmed a holding that FPL could not recover in
tort as a matter of law because the Texas Commission on Environmental
Quality (TCEQ) (formerly the Texas Natural Resource Conservation
Commission (TNRCC)) had authorized the wells. The supreme court re-
versed the court of appeals holding that “a government-issued permit
does not shield the permit holder from civil tort liability.”315 But the su-
preme court also “reserved the question of whether ‘subsurface waste-
water migration can constitute a trespass.’”316 Thus, this important
question had not been reached.
310. Id. at 146, 148–50.
311. Envtl. Processing Sys., L.C. v. FPL Farming, Ltd., 457 S.W.3d 414, 425 (Tex. 2015).
312. Id. at 416.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 421.
315. Id. at 418.
316. Id.
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The court of appeals determined that there was a common law trespass
case of action and that consent was an affirmative defense to a trespass
action “on which EPS bore the burden of proof.”317 Accordingly, the jury
charge would have been improper. In this opinion, the supreme court
again addressed the common law trespass cause of action and found that
the party alleging trespass must prove the unauthorized entry and that
consent was not an affirmative defense.318 In doing so, the supreme court
was able to affirm the trial court decision without addressing the continu-
ing question of whether a trespass cause of action exists for deep subsur-
face wastewater migration.
As indicated in another case, the Texas Supreme Court also noted an
issue it had not had an opportunity to address—damages for trespass—
and it found its opportunity in Gilbert Wheeler, Inc. v. Enbridge Pipelines,
L.P.319 Interestingly enough, the EPS case was argued January 7, 2014,
but the opinion was not delivered until February 6, 2015, while the Gil-
bert Wheeler case was argued later, February 27, 2014, and an opinion
delivered earlier, August 29, 2014. Thus, at the time of delivering the
opinion for EPS, the supreme court had an opportunity to address dam-
ages in connection with a trespass, but the Gilbert Wheeler case does a
good job of talking through the various elements of damages. In particu-
lar, the supreme court addressed the temporary versus permanent injury
to real property distinction. Permanent injury was redefined by Justice
Lehrmann as follows:
An injury to real property is considered permanent if (a) it cannot be
repaired, fixed, or restored, or (b) even though the injury can be re-
paired, fixed, or restored, it is substantially certain that the injury will
repeatedly, continually, and regularly recur, such that future injury
can be reasonably evaluated. Conversely, an injury to real property
is considered temporary if (a) it can be repaired, fixed, or restored,
and (b) any anticipated recurrence would be only occasional, irregu-
lar, intermittent, and not reasonably predictable, such that future in-
jury could not be estimated with reasonable certainty. These
definitions apply to cases in which entry onto real property is physi-
cal (as in a trespass) and to cases in which entry onto real property is
not physical (as with a nuisance).320
The general rule of damages in real property cases “is the cost to re-
store or replace, plus loss of use for temporary injury, and loss in fair
market value for permanent injury.”321 The general rule for the measure
of damages has an exception for economic feasibility, which is when the
cost to restore or replace “exceeds the diminution in the property’s mar-
ket value to such a disproportionately high degree that the repairs are no
317. Id.
318. Id. at 425.
319. 449 S.W.3d 474, 476 (Tex. 2014).
320. Id. at 480.
321. Id. at 481.
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longer economically feasible.”322 This exception basically converts a tem-
porary injury to a permanent injury, and damages are awarded for the
loss in fair market value. But in cases involving real property injured by
the destruction of trees, the loss in fair market value is not the measure
because “even when . . . the value of the land has not declined [due to the
destruction], [courts] have held that the injured party may nevertheless
recover for the trees’ intrinsic value.”323 Thus, in this case, although there
was no loss to the fair market value of the land due to the clearing of
trees, it was clear that restoration was possible, and the jury found that
the cost to do so was $288,000.00.324 Because remaining issues existed,
this case was remanded to the appellate court to address the outstanding
questions.
There were a number of appeals cases dealing with nuisance, mostly
from a factually intensive perspective. Three cases were interesting only
by reason of the matters the courts found to constitute a basis for a nui-
sance claim. In Crosstex North Texas Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, negligent
operation by a natural gas pipeline operator in operating a compressor
station such that excessive noise and vibrations existed was a basis for a
negligent nuisance claim.325 After examination of the evidence, the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals did find that the evidence was factually insuffi-
cient to support the jury’s negligent nuisance finding, but, just the same,
allowed such a claim based on the operation of a compressor station.326
Justice Sue Walker filed a dissent, challenging the court of appeals’ re-
view of the evidence and substitution of its own opinion.327 In Kim v.
State of Texas, the First Houston Court of Appeals held that recurring
criminal activity could constitute a nuisance.328
B. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT
In Lauret v. Meritage Homes of Texas, LLC, the Austin Court of Ap-
peals reviewed a decision by the trial court denying a recovery to home
purchasers because they failed to show that they had no other remedy
available when they sought restoration under the Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices Act.329 The court of appeals largely followed the previous Texas Su-
preme Court case of Cruz v. Andrews Restoration, Inc. and found that the
deceptive trade practices was not a codification of the common law and
that restoration was a remedy provided by the DTPA, which a prevailing
322. Id.
323. Id. at 482.
324. Id. at 484.
325. Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, 451 S.W.3d 150, 175–76 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2014), aff’d, No. 15-0049, 2016 WL 3483165 (Tex. June 24, 2016).
326. Id.
327. Id. at 179.
328. Kim v. State of Texas, 451 S.W.3d 557, 563–64 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2014, pet. denied).
329. Lauret v. Meritage Homes of Tex., LLC, 455 S.W.3d 695, 699 (Tex. App.—Austin
2014, no pet.).
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consumer could choose.330 The court of appeals held that the trial court
was required to honor that election by the consumer.331 In this case, the
plaintiff consumers purchased a home on Lake Travis with the represen-
tation that the view of the lake would not be blocked by other improve-
ments. They also were shown a plat that included a twenty-five-foot
setback, but it turned out that the setback line was not recorded or part of
any ordinance. The architectural committee of the homeowners’ associa-
tion could and did waive the setback for an adjoining landowner. The jury
found in favor of the plaintiff consumers, but “the trial court entered a
take-nothing judgment in favor of Meritage Homes” because Lauret
failed to show that there was no adequate remedy at law.332 The court of
appeals reversed this finding and, as noted, found that “requiring a party
to prove that he lacks an adequate remedy at law is inconsistent with
DPTA restoration.”333 The court of appeals concluded “that a consumer
seeking restoration under the DPTA is not required to prove that he
lacks an adequate remedy at law.”334
Also, as a practice tip to plaintiff’s counsel, Meritage Homes raised an
issue that because the home was more than $500,000.00, it was excepted
from the DPTA, unless the plaintiff demonstrated that the property was
intended to be a residence. In this case, there was sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that the property was intended to be a residence, but it ap-
peared that the plaintiffs did not undertake specific steps to demonstrate
the residential nature of the property.335 The court of appeals reviewed
the record and sustained the application of the DPTA because there was
sufficient evidence to establish the property was purchased as a resi-
dence.336 Better practice might dictate a clearer showing that the prop-
erty was purchased as a residence.
In another case demonstrating the importance of accurate statements,
Jones v. Zearfoss, the seller represented that a water penetration had
been professionally corrected.337 This was in fact true, in that a profes-
sional third party had been retained to correct the water penetration. Two
years later mold contamination was discovered and possibly was due to
an unsuccessful correction of the water penetration. The representation,
however, was correct in that a professional third party had been retained
to correct the water penetration and that was disclosed. “[A] seller has no
duty to disclose facts he does not know.”338
330. Id. (citing Cruz v. Andrews Restoration, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 817, 825 (Tex. 2012)).
331. Id. at 700.
332. Id. at 697.
333. Id. at 700.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 702.
336. Id.
337. Jones v. Zearfoss, 456 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, no pet.).
338. Id. at 625 (quoting Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson Assocs., Ltd., 896
S.W.2d 156, 162 (Tex. 1995)).
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C. PREMISES LIABILITY
The Texas Supreme Court delved into the area of premises liability
four times during the Survey period. In the first instance, the supreme
court dealt with the recreational use statute, Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code §§ 75.001 and 75.002, and Texas Government Code
§ 22.225. In University of Texas at Arlington v. Williams, the supreme
court reviewed the recreational use statute, which in essence “protects
landowners who open [their] property for public recreational pur-
poses.”339 When it applies, it “immunizes the landowner or occupant
from ordinary negligence claims associated with the property’s recrea-
tional use by requiring the plaintiff to establish gross negligence” for lia-
bility and recovery.340 The Williams family attended a high school soccer
match on a soccer field at the University of Texas at Arlington (UTA).
Sandra Williams leaned against a gate that had a broken latch but was
secured with a chain and padlock. The gate unexpectedly opened, and she
fell onto the field five feet below and injured one of her ribs and her left
arm. UTA raised the recreational use statute as a defense, and the su-
preme court thus addressed the question of whether or not “recreation”
included competitive sports and its spectators.341 In particular, Subpart
(L) of the list of recreational activities includes “any other activity associ-
ated with enjoying nature or the outdoors.”342 The supreme court had
previously found in City of Bellmead v. Torres that a swing set and play-
ground at a soccer complex fell within Subpart (L).343 The supreme court
indicated that this did not address the issue of a competitive sport at a
sporting facility.344 The policy behind the recreational use statute was “to
encourage landowners to open private land for natural pursuits.”345 The
majority of the court concluded that the statute did not include competi-
tive sports and spectating as recreational activities.346
The decision was not without dispute as Justice Guzman filed a concur-
ring opinion in which Justice Willett joined; Justice Boyd filed a concur-
ring opinion; Justice Johnson filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, and in which Justice Brown joined. In the dissent, Jus-
tice Johnson found that the distinction between watching birds and
watching children was unwarranted.347 Justice Johnson also felt that the
list of activities would include a mother watching her daughter’s soccer
game, and he disagreed with a distinction between competitive and non-
competitive aspects to activities.348 Finally, Justice Johnson also dissented
339. Univ. of Tex. at Arlington v. Williams, 459 S.W.3d 48, 49, 51 (Tex. 2015).
340. Id. at 49.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 51.
343. Id. at 52 (citing City of Bellmead v. Torres, 89 S.W.3d 611, 615 (Tex. 2002)).
344. Id. at 54–55.
345. Id. at 54.
346. Id. at 57.
347. Id. at 63–64 (Johnson, J. dissenting).
348. Id. at 65.
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as to the recreational use statute overriding “the Tort Claims Act to the
extent of any conflict.”349 “The recreational use statute [would] pre-
clude[ ] the Williamses’ ordinary negligence claim against UTA,” but it
“would otherwise be allowed by the Tort Claims Act if the recreational
use statute encompassed such a claim.”350 On the other hand, “a statu-
tory waiver of immunity must be clear and unambiguous in order to be
effective,”351 and the recreational statute is at best unclear in this situa-
tion. Thus, Justice Johnson found that the recreational statute would ap-
ply to the Williams ordinary negligence claim but would remand for the
consideration of the claim that UTA was grossly negligent.352
The Texas Supreme Court also addressed the issue of duty, which is a
threshold question when it comes to premises liability. It actually did so
in two cases. In the first, Abutahoun v. Dow Chemical Company, the
Texas Supreme Court addressed Chapter 95 of the Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code.353 Chapter 95 establishes “limitations on a property
owner’s liability for [personal] injury, death, or property damage to . . .
independent contractor[s]” and their employees.354 The supreme court
thoroughly reviewed the sections of Chapter 95, and in reading the provi-
sions together, held that “Chapter 95 applies to a claim against a property
owner for an independent contractor’s personal injury, death, or property
damage caused by negligence,” noting that “[t]he Legislature did not dis-
tinguish between negligence claims based on contemporaneous activity or
otherwise, and neither [should the court].”355 Then, comparing § 95.002’s
wording of “condition or use” to the Texas Tort Claims Act, the supreme
court concluded that Chapter 95 “appl[ied] to all negligence claims that
arise from either a premises defect or the negligent activity of a property
owner or its employees.”356 An independent contractor may have “the
right to recover damages from a negligent property owner,” but Chapter
95 is applicable.357 If the plaintiff satisfied the evidentiary burdens of
both prongs of § 95.003, it can and does have a “claim[ ] for damages
caused by contemporaneous negligent acts of a property owner.”358 Un-
fortunately for the plaintiffs in this case, they apparently did not chal-
lenge the court of appeals conclusion that “the record [did] not support
. . . liability as to [the property owner] pursuant to the requirements of
Chapter 95.”359 Thus, the supreme court was unable to address those pos-




353. Abutahoun v. Dow Chem. Co., 463 S.W.3d 42, 43 (Tex. 2015).
354. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 95.001–.004).
355. Id. at 48.
356. Id. at 50–51.
357. Id. at 51.
358. Id. at 52.
359. Id. (quoting Dow Chem. Co. V. Abutahoun, 395 S.W.3d 335, 348 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2013), opinion withdrawn by No. 13-0175, 2014 Tex. LEXIS 1139 (Tex. Nov. 21,
2014)).
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sible issues.360
In summary, Chapter 95 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code applies to independent contractor claims against property owners
for damages caused by negligence when those claims arise from the con-
dition or use of an improvement to real property where the independent
contractor constructs, repairs, renovates, or modifies the improvement.
“Chapter 95 limits property owner liability on claims for personal injury,
death, or property damage caused by negligence, including claims con-
cerning a property owner’s own contemporaneous negligent activity.”
One might question whether a premises liability statute requiring knowl-
edge and a failure to adequately warn was really intended to protect con-
temporaneous negligent activities of a property owner.
The Texas Supreme Court also addressed duty in Graham Central Sta-
tion, Inc. v. Pena, in which a patron was allegedly assaulted by other pa-
trons in an altercation outside the nightclub.361 The plaintiff alleged that
the corporation owned the nightclub and failed to provide adequate se-
curity. The supreme court’s opinion did not deal with the security issue so
much as who had the duty to protect the patron. The supreme court did
note in its discussion of negligence that, generally, “a person [does not
have a] legal duty to protect another from the criminal acts of a third
person.”362 “However, ‘one who controls . . . premises does have a duty
. . . to protect invitees from criminal acts of third parties if he . . . has
reason to know of an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of harm to the
invitee.’”363 In this case, the corporate defendant was not contesting that
premise but disputed that it was the owner under this proposition of law.
As it turns out, Pharr Entertainment Complex, L.L.C. owned the night
club, and the president of GCS, the corporate defendant, also owned a
minority interest in the LLC. There was no reasonable inference that
GCS was somehow the owner of the nightclub or in control of the prem-
ises. The supreme court granted the petition for review, and, without
hearing oral argument, reversed and rendered in favor of GCS.364
A number of appellate court cases also dealt with the owner or control
issue. In Rosa v. Mestena Operating, LLC, a mineral leaseholder was po-
tentially liable as a property owner exercising control,365 and in Oncor
Electric Delivery Company, LLC v. Murillo, an easement holder was a
potentially responsible party.366 And, following up on the Texas Supreme
Court’s Graham Central Station decision, in Quick Trip Corporation v.
Goodwin, a convenience store owner was potentially responsible and had
360. Id.
361. Grand Cent. Station, Inc. v. Pena, 442 S.W.3d 261, 262 (Tex. 2014).
362. Id. at 263 (quoting Timerwalk Apartments v. Cain, 972 S.W.2d 749, 756 (Tex.
1998)).
363. Id. (quoting Cain, 972 S.W.2d at 756).
364. Id. at 265.
365. Rosa v. Mestena Operating, LLC, 461 S.W.3d 181, 187–88 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2014, pet. denied).
366. Oncor Elec. Delivery Co., LLC v. Murillo, 449 S.W.3d 583, 595–96 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).
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a duty to protect against third party criminal acts where past criminal
conduct had occurred at or near the premises.367 The Fort Worth Court of
Appeals examined “the proximity, recency, frequency, similarity, and
publicity of that conduct to determine what similar future conduct was
reasonably foreseeable.”368 In this case, the plaintiff did not carry the
burden, and the criminal act against the plaintiff was not foreseeable. Be-
cause the convenience store then “had no duty as a matter of law, it could
not be liable.”369
The Texas Supreme Court also addressed the adequacy of warnings in
Henkel v. Norman.370 In this case, an individual delivering mail slipped
on ice and sustained injuries. The homeowner had stated to the plaintiff:
“[D]on’t slip.”371 In view of the below-freezing weather and the fact that
the pedestrian delivering the mail heard the warning, the supreme court
found that this was not a general instruction but was sufficient to notify of
the particular condition.372 Similarly, in Golden Corral Corp. v. Trigg, a
yellow sign with a warning on each of its four sides had been placed on
the tile floor stating “Caution Wet Floor.”373 “[The plaintiff] testified that
she [had] not see[n] the warning before she fell,” but surveillance video
showed the sign directly in front of her and even struck her as she slipped
and fell.374 Despite a jury’s finding in favor of the plaintiff, the Beaumont
Court of Appeals found that the warning was adequate and reasonably
prudent under the circumstances and that the plaintiff’s claim failed as a
matter of law.375
Four other appellate cases dealt with the issue of whether or not the
owner was aware of a condition. These cases, again, emphasize that one
of the threshold questions is the existence and violation of a duty, which
only arises in the event that the owner is aware of the condition.376
D. WATER RIGHTS
Probably the most significant case dealing with water rights during the
Survey period was Texas Commission on Environmental Quality v. Texas
367. QuickTrip Corp. v. Goodwin, 449 S.W.3d 665, 674–75 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2014, pet. denied).
368. Id. at 671.
369. Id. at 677.
370. 441 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. 2014).
371. Id. at 251.
372. Id. at 252.
373. Golden Corral Corp. v. Trigg, 443 S.W.3d 515, 517 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014,
no pet.).
374. Id.
375. Id. at 520.
376. See Pay & Save, Inc. v. Martinez, 452 S.W.3d 923 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, pet.
denied) (cucumber peel); Del Toro v. Pay & Save, Inc., 444 S.W.3d 293 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2014, pet. denied) (puddle of water); Cohen v. Landry’s Inc., 442 S.W.3d 818 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet denied) (elevation change in sidewalk); E.I. Du Pont
de Nemours & Co. v. Roye, 460 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2015, pet. denied)
(ground gave way).
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Farm Bureau.377 In that decision, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals
found that the TCEQ could not interpret the water code provision as
allowing temporary suspension of water rights during a drought to reest-
ablish priorities.378 In this situation, the TCEQ temporarily suspended
the right of a person holding a senior water right before junior water
rights were suspended, based on public health concerns. The court of ap-
peals found that this was not a reasonable interpretation and not entitled
to deference.379 In this case, the TCEQ had sought to suspend water
rights of agricultural users before suspending junior water rights in urban
areas. Recently, on February 19, 2016, the Texas Supreme Court declined
to review the decision of the court of appeals.380 TCEQ stated that priori-
tizing access for cities and power plants is essential for public health,
safety, and welfare throughout the State during times of drought. Not
only were agricultural users affected, but also Dow Chemical, which was
one of the oldest users of water on the Brazos River using water to ex-
tract magnesium from sea water. This decision resulted in more careful
monitoring of use and the likely appointment of more water masters to
control fresh water usage.
X. CONCLUSION
Texas cases continue to address challenges to single-family foreclosures
and continue to reach conflicting decisions on the standing to challenge
assignments of deeds of trust without a corresponding assignment of the
note (the “split note and mortgage” defense and the “show me the note”
challenge). This is likely to continue until the Texas Supreme Court
brings a conclusion to the discrepancies.
In a case of first impression, attorneys’ fees may be awarded in a de-
claratory judgment action with recourse against the homestead mortga-
gor. Another case of first impression reminds the practitioner that a
forged deed of trust creates title issues, removing jurisdiction from the
justice courts in a forcible detainer action. Additionally, practitioners
must now be mindful of the scope (or lack thereof) of injunction orders
with regard to limitation periods in nonjudicial and judicial foreclosures,
along with suits on the underlying debt.
Texas cases continue to bring drafting lessons to the real estate practi-
tioner. Deeds need to specify the intention of the grant and need to be
consistent when seeking to describe the conveyed real property, whether
by general versus specific reference to a prior deed or otherwise. Com-
mon references such as “right-of-way” are traps for the unwary. Another
important case dealt with roads to landlocked property—the Texas Su-
377. 460 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2015, pet. denied).
378. Id. at 272.
379. Id.
380. Tex. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality v. Tex. Farm Bureau, No. 15-0359, 2016 Tex.
LEXIS 162 (Tex. Feb. 19, 2016) (denying petition for review).
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preme Court made it clear that an easement by necessity theory was the
only theory by which an implied easement could be created.
In another case that provided drafting lessons for the real estate practi-
tioner, the use of the phrase “all leases including ground leases” in both a
security instrument and a bill of sale proved to be problematic because it
failed to provide sufficient information to satisfy the statute of frauds be-
cause it did not identify the premises to be transferred with “any reasona-
ble certainty.”381 In several other cases, the courts addressed oral
modifications, and despite the somewhat surprising conclusion in one
particular case whereby the party relying on the oral modification ulti-
mately prevailed, the cases present an important reminder to all real es-
tate practitioners of the importance of codifying all modifications in
writing to ensure that the intended results are upheld.
Several other cases of note reiterated, clarified, or expanded in issues
covered in previous reviews: (i) the perceived conflict between the venue
selection for major transactions found in § 15.020 of the Texas Civil Prac-
tice and Remedies Code and the provisions of § 15.0115, which mandates
a suit between a landlord and tenant must be brought in the venue where
the premises are located; (ii) the jurisdiction of the justice courts; (iii)
what constitutes an executory contract; and (iv) the application of the
Certificate of Merit Statute to breach of contract suits.
The Texas Supreme Court also spent a significant amount of time ad-
dressing trespass and premises liability. At least two cases announced
rules of first impression dealing with the burden of proof and damages for
trespass. In the context of premises liability, the supreme court provided
a thorough analysis of Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code Chapter
95 and adopted a broad application.
381. Rossman v. Bishop Colo. Retail Plaza, L.P., 455 S.W.3d 797, 808 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2015, pet. denied).
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